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REQUIRING BATTERED WOMEN DIE:
MURDER LIABILITY FOR MOTHERS
UNDER FAILURE TO PROTECT STATUTES
MICHELLE S. JACOBS'
Pauline Zile allowed her daughter to die. During 7-year-old Christina Holt's terrifying
last weeks of life, Pauline Zile wasn't a mother; she was a co-conspirator'
1 will never forget seeing Christina on the living roomfloor, nor her laying on the bed .
INTRODUCTION
She was a sorrowful sight as she appeared before the nation
on the evening news. A thin, modestly dressed woman with
tired lines etched into her face. Every parent's worst nightmare
had just come true for her. Her daughter disappeared that day
from the bathroom in a flea market.3 Pauline Zile looked into
the camera and sent her daughter a consoling message:
"Mommy's going to find you. I love her. Her little brothers
miss her so much. We want her to come home."4 She told her
"Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. My thanks to
Professor PaulaJohnson for reading the first draft, and to Professors Angela Davis,
Nancy Dowd, Dorothy Roberts and Christopher Slobogin for comments and criti-
cisms. Many thanks to my research assistant, Yolonda Jones. This article was made
possible by the University of Florida Law Center Foundation Summer Research Grant
Program.
'The Killing of Pauline: Rage Not Punishment PALM BEACH PosT, Apr. 19, 1995, at
10A (comments from the State Attorney during the opening of Pauline Zile's murder
case).
MikeFolks, Rubin Outlines Mom's Defense: Control by Spouse Who Beat Daughter, FLA.
SuN-SENTiNEL, Nov. 4, 1994, at lB (statement by Pauline Zile contained in a letter dis-
closed by her counsel).
3 Stephanie Smith, Prosecutor:. Doing Nothing Makes Zile Guilty in Death, Rubin Says
Pauline Prosecuted Only for Lying to Public on T, FLA. SuN-SENTIEL, Apr. 4, 1995, at 4.
4 Id. See also Appellant's Initial Brief at 11, Zile v. State (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(No. 95-2252).
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daughter not to be afraid and encouraged her, if she could, to
try and find a way to call home."
This is how the public was first introduced to Pauline Zile of
Rivera Beach, Florida, whose seven-year-old daughter, Christina
Holt, was reported missing on October 22, 1994.6 For three
days, her neighbors, the police, and the public-at-large searched
for Christina Fairly quickly after the announcement of little
Christina's disappearance, however, suspicions about the verac-
ity of Pauline Zile's disappearance report began to mount. A
witness from the Swap Shop-the flea market where Pauline
Zile first reported the disappearance-had some doubts about
the missing child." An early report that the child had been
found evoked a strange response from her mother. Even before
it was confirmed that the child was not Christina, Pauline Zile
had expressed doubt that the child was her daughter.9
All too soon, the public came to understand why Christina's
mother was so sure she had not been found. Christina was dead
and had been dead for a month before Pauline Zile appeared
on television and reported her missing.10 She died during the
course of a beating administered by John Zile, her stepfather."
'Appellant's Initial Brief at 11, Zile (No. 95-2252). It seems ironic now in light of
our knowledge of the circumstances of Christina's death that at the time Pauline Zile
seemed to be speaking to two audiences: her daughter and the public. My thanks to
PaulaJohnson for the observation.
6 Christina Holt was Pauline's daughter through a previous marriage to Frank
Holt. The Holts lived in Maryland and prior to June 1994, Christina lived with Frank
Holt's mother and then his grandmother. See F.B.I. INvEGATV REP. No. 7A-MM-
71836 (Oct. 28, 1994). In June of 1994, the Holts returned Christina to Pauline and
John Zile with little or no notice. See Marego Athans, Recalling a Charade: Friends of
Christina's Family Re-create Incidents, Paint Portrait of a Family in Decline, FLA. SUN-
SENTmNEL, Nov. 11, 1994 at 1A. At the time, Pauline was seven months pregnant with
a child she andJohn had already decided to give up for adoption. Id.
7 Immediately after the report of Christine's disappearance, 13 different social
service and law enforcement agencies offered aid. Among them were the Ft. Lauder-
dale Police, the Broward County Sheriff's Office, the Florida Department of Law En-
forcement, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Jenny Deam, The Secret Death of
Christina, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, at A. The Adam Walsh Center dis-
tributed approximately 10,000 fliers throughout South Florida. Id.
' Stephanie Smith, Many Doubted Ziles' Story: FBI Files Reveal Some Suspected Kidnap-
ping Tale From Start, FL.& SuN-SENTINTEL, Dec. 31, 1994, at lB. Pauline did not accom-
pany the others when they rushed to determine whether the child was Christina. Id.
' Id.; Trial Tr. 16 at 1745, Zile v. State (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (No. 95-2252)
[hereinafter TRI; see also Appellant's Initial Brief at 15, Zile (No. 95-2252).
10Deam, supra note 7, at 1A.
"Folks, supra note 2, at 1A.
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To stifle Christina's cries during the beating, he covered her
mouth . She choked to death on her own vomit.13 Her body lay
hidden in a bedroom closet for several days before John Zile
buried her in a field behind a K-Mart store in Tequesta, Flor-
ida. 4 Pauline Zile's child died not by her mother's hand but as
"I. Dr. James Benz, the county medical examiner, testified the sole cause of
death was asphyxia (lack of oxygen). Appellant's Initial Brief at 18, Zile (No. 95-
2252).
" Athens, supra note 6, at 1A. The announcement of Christina's "disappearance"
occurred two days before Susan Smith's boys were allegedly abducted in a car-jacking
committed by an unknown black man in South Carolina. A teary-eyed Susan Smith
also came before the public begging for the safe return of her children. See Kenneth
A. Gailliard, Man Takes Car with Children Inside, RocK HInL HERALD, Oct. 26, 1994, at
1A (describing the assailant as a black man in his late twenties or early thirties, wear-
ing a plaid shirt, blue jeans and a toboggan-type hat). Yet, Smith's children would
not be found alive either, as she had strapped them into their car seats and driven the
car into a lake, where the boys drowned. IdI. When it became apparent that both
women had attempted to pull the wool over the public's eyes, there was a tremendous
outpouring of hostility towards them. Calls were immediately made for the imposi-
tion of the death penalty against both women. SeeAthens, supra note 6, at 1A; see also
Donations to Prosecute Mother Will Be Returned, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1995, at A3 (city offi-
cials in South Carolina had to return $1,147 in donations that were made to help the
city prosecute Smith; some of the notes accompanying the donations specifically
called for the death penalty); Appellant's Initial Brief at 74-81, Zile (No. 95-2252).
Initially the two cases appeared to be very similar. Both women were young. Both
were initially portrayed in media reports as being selfish: Pauline was supposedly
more concerned about her husband than her child, while Smith reportedly thought
her children would be inconvenient for a new boyfriend. But, as the facts developed,
more became known about these mothers. Susan Smith's children died from an af-
firmative act by their own mother's hand. Yet, as a result of the pretrial and pre-
sentencing handling of the evidence by Smith's lawyer, as well as the evidence pre-
sented during the sentencing phase, the public learned many new things about Susan
Smith. See Al Dozier, Smith's Mental State "Fragile, "ROCK H.L HERALD, Nov. 21, 1994,
at 1A (reporting that Smith's lawyer immediately painted a picture of a fragile woman
who had lost the ability to make decisions for herself); see alsoJesseJ. Holland, Victim
of Her Own Crime?, RoCKHL HERALD, July 9, 1995, at 1A [hereinafter Holland, Victim
of Her Own Crime] (stating that from the first day the lawyers were hired they intended
to focus on her mental state). She was sexually abused by her step-father for an ex-
tended period of time. She was separated from the father of the boys and had ini-
tially charged him with infidelity. During the trial there was testimony that after the
separation he threatened Smith's boyfriend with physical harm and threatened to re-
veal her stepfather's incest to the public. SeeJesseJ. Holland, Smith Trial: "It's like..
.TV," RoCK=Hi HERALD, July 24, 1995, at 1A (stating that she suffered through bouts
of depression); see also Henry Eichel, Media Circus Never Really Came To Town For Fast
Triae4 Penalty Phase the "Real" Tria, SUN. PATRIOT-NEvs, July 23, 1995, at A9 (noting
that three law enforcement officers originally subpoenaed by the prosecution gave
testimony for the defense, detailing Smith's despondent demeanor when she con-
fessed). In light of the new information about Smith, the sentiment of her commu-
nity softened towards her. Calls for the death penalty diminished and she was
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. See Holland, Victim of Her Own
1998]
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a result of the affirmative act of John Zile. Yet, Pauline was
charged with first degree murder. 5 The state alleged that she
failed to prevent John's actions, which were classified as aggra-
vated child abuse, an enumerated felony under Florida felony
murder statute.16 Thus, Zile is the first woman in Florida to be
convicted by a jury for first degree murder based on failure to
protect her child.
1 7
Zile's counsel did little before the trial to develop the facts
of her life.18 Through a press release at the beginning of the
representation, her counsel intimated that a defense would be
fashioned which would focus on John's violent behavior toward
Pauline; yet no evidence was produced for the press or at trial. 9
Other than her defense counsel's own opinions about the merit
of the State's case, the only view the public had of Pauline Zile
came in a letter that she wrote to Ellis Rubin, her lawyer, which
was released to the press. In the letter Zile constructs a list of
regrets she had in her life, including her failure to get help for
Christina on the night of her death.20 Rather than helping the
public understand Pauline better, defense counsel's release of
Crime, supra (one woman stated "I kept thinking of my own daughter when I think
about her.... Ijust can't see coldly telling someone to kill someone I know").
" SeeAppellant's Initial Brief at 2, Zile (No. 95-2252).
16 See infra discussion in Part III.
17 Pauline was convicted of first degree felony murder on July 22, 1995. She is not,
however, the first woman in the State of Florida to be charged with first degree mur-
der for failure to protect. Others have been charged but entered pleas to second de-
gree murder charges in order to escape exposure to the death penalty. Women in
other states have been convicted of first degree murder on a failure to protect theory.
See People v. Novy, 597 N.E.2d 273 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (first conviction in the United
States for murder on a failure to protect theory); see also People v. Peters, 606 N.E.2d
1201 (Ill. 1992) (first degree murder established on the theory of accountability). See
infra text accompanying notes 38-46 for discussion of failure to protect theory.
'8 Pauline Zile was represented by noted criminal defense attorney Ellis Rubin.
Rubin had the reputation of defending clients on the basis of their "victim" status.
'9 Folks, supra note 2, at lB. The information, however, seemed readily available.
Reporters for the Sun-Sentinel interviewed the Ziles' landlord who recounted that
Pauline and the children seldom left the apartment. She recounted thatJohn always
answered the door, and he always delivered the rent money. See Robin Fields, Experts
Have No Easy Explanation Mhy Christina's Mom Did Nothing, FLA. SuN-SENTINEL, Nov. 1,
1994, at 4B. In response to the public's disbelief that a mother could help conceal
her child's murder, Dr. Elaine Ducharme, a consultant psychologist with West Palm
Beach's Family Sexual Treatment Program, explained that "[t]he terror of being
abandoned or of what he might do to her may have been so great that she became
immobilized." Id.
2SeeFolks, supra note 2, at lB. Pauline Zile listed six regrets in her letter, three of
which referenced not knowing aboutJohn's violence and not being able to confront
him. Id
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the letter backfired: the State Attorney's office used the letter to
establish that Pauline knew she had a duty to do something to
save her child.2 Little of the State's case-in-chief focused on the
Zile family life for any household member besides Christina.2
Counsel for Pauline Zile presented no witnesses on her behalf,
choosing to rest at the conclusion of the State's case. No more
was known about Pauline Zile at the conclusion of her case than
was known at its inception. She remained an enigma to the
public and friends alike.23 No one came to learn of the many
markers which suggested that John Zile was violent towards
Pauline as well as Christina.24 Calls for the death penalty were
unabated and when she was sentenced to life without the possi-
bility of parole the public felt it had been cheated. People
wanted her to die.25
Contrast the treatment Pauline Zile received to the public
and legal response to a father similarly situated. David Schwarz
was the father of AJ., a child who was killed during the same pe-
riod of time as Christina Zile in a neighboring Florida commu-
21 Stephanie Smith, Pauline Zile Trial To Begin Today; Meek Image Disappearing in Jail
forDefendant in Death of Daughter, FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 27, 1995, at lB. Prior to the
release of the letter the State had little to back its theory that Pauline was equally re-
sponsible for the death of Christina. Prosecutors said Zile handed them their sum-
mation with the letter. Id
' The State's main witness was an "ear" witness who alleged she overheard the
sound ofJohn Zile beating Christina and on a separate occasion overheard Pauline
slap Christina. See Appellant's Initial Brief at 12, Zile (No. 95-2252). The State also
attempted, unsuccessfully, to introduce testimony that Pauline was once observed hit-
ting one of her sons with a stick. Id. at 89.
s See Athans, supra note 6, at 1A. Co-worker Bridget McKinlay stated that she
hardly recognized the hardened face (Pauline's) she saw on the eleven o'clock news.
It was a far cry from what she described as the "porcelain doll" who carried a key
chain with pictures of all of her children. Id. See also Mike Folks & Terence Shine,
Differing Images Emerge in Zile Closing Arguments, FA. SuN-SENTINEL, May 15, 1996, at
lB. A local attorney noted that Pauline would have benefited if her jury heard some
of the details about her made known only inJohn's trial.
24 See Folks, supra note 2, at 1B; Athans, supra note 6, at IA; Fields, supra note 19, at
4B.
, See, e.g., Christine Stapleton, Zile Sentenced to Life Without Parole, PALm BEACH POST,
June 8, 1995, at 1k. Christina's great grandmother was quoted in the article as saying,
"I want some of those inmates to be my heroes. I want them to beat her to death for
what she put Christina through." Id. The media attention and the public's rage to-
wards and obsession with Pauline was starkly different from the public and media in-
difference to the case of Clover Boykin who intentionally smothered two children,
one of them her own child. She was sentenced to life in prison. Id.
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nity.2 6 The boy's stepmother, Jessica Schwarz, was arrested and
charged with abusing him over an eighteen month period.2
The abuse eventually caused the child's death . David Schwarz
lived with the family during the period of time Jessica abused
the boy.2 When the boy died, the stepmother was prosecuted
for murder. No failure to protect charges were brought against
David and there were no public outcries seeking his deaths
David Schwarz was allowed to "get on with his life" and forget
the tragic death of his son.3' Pauline Zile and Jessica Schwarz,
32on the other hand, will spend the rest of their lives in prison.
This article explores the legal dilemma of a growing num-
ber of women who find themselves-as perhaps Pauline Zile
did-at the intersection of domestic violence and child abuse:
women who are accused of murdering their children when
spouses or significant others have actually killed the children in
a household where violence rules. These women may have ei-
ther a justification or an excuse defense available to them but
are effectively precluded from taking advantage of such de-
fenses either through the ignorance of their lawyers or by gen-
der bias in the application of criminal law.33
Progress has been made in educating the public, law en-
forcement and the actors within the judicial system about the
realities of violence against women and against children within
16 See Mike Folks, A.J. Case Haunts Father: David Schwarz Says Wife Didn't Kill Boy, FL.
SuN-SENTINEL, July 17, 1995, at 1B [hereinafter Folks, A.J. Case Haunts Father].
Pauline Zile and Jessica Schwarz were convicted on the same day. See Mike Folks, Two
South F7orida Women Were Convicted on Tuesday in the Murders of Their Children, FLA. SUN-
SENTN EL, Apr. 12, 1995 at 1A.
See Larry Barszewski, A.J. Had No Chance For Life: Files Show Physical and Emotional
Abuses, FiA. SuN-SENTNEL, Nov. 14, 1993, at lB.
28 id
2However, he did work as a trucker and was away at times. Folks, A.J. Case Haunts
Father, supra note 26, at lB.
' In fact, the state only subpoenaed the father to testify at the stepmother's trial.
He failed to appear to testify, but was not held in contempt. Id.
" Jessica Schwarz was sentenced to 30 years for aggravated assault and 40 years for
second degree murder. See Stephanie Smith, Schwartz Sentenced to 40 More Years; Step-
mother Shows No Remorse, Fr. LAUDERDALE SUN SENTINEL, Aug. 5 1995, at lB.
"My discussion is restricted to non-abusing battered mothers. Criminal law theo-
ries of punishment are clearer for the actor who intentionally or purposefully engages
in behavior that harms. Battered mothers who actively abuse present a more difficult
moral and legal problem. While there may also be defenses available for battered




the home. However, the critical interconnections between vio-
lence against the mother and violence against her children have
not been fully understood by our courts. No consistent theory
has been developed for the defense of mothers that is based on
the connection between the abuse that a mother is receiving at
the hands of the violent partner and her ability to prevent harm
to her children. In fact, though public awareness of child abuse
increased at the same time as awareness of domestic violence
increased, the two seem to work at odds with each others As
awareness of the abuse increases, so does the likelihood of
prosecution for the mother-despite the fact that both mother
and child are abused by the same person. Courts have been re-
luctant to excuse the mother's failure to save the child from
abuse on the grounds that she herself has been abused. In fact,
the mother's encounter with violence in a sense heightens her
dilemma. The courts reason that since she is aware of the vio-
lence that occurs in the home, she should do more to ensure
that her children are shielded from that violence.""
Nor have advances in post-conviction relief benefited the
women whose children have been killed by a violent intimate.
Many states have developed post conviction remedies for
women who can establish that they were battered by spouses
whom they killed.s6 However, when a woman is convicted of the
See infra discussion in Part H.
One would expect some cross analysis of the battered woman syndrome theory
to determine whether the woman could have, or even should have attempted to in-
tervene, given the partner's propensity for violence. Even when the cross analysis has
been done, courts have held that the mother's own abuse was irrelevant to determi-
nation of whether or not she failed to protect her child. See, e.g., In re Dalton, 424
N.E.2d 1226, 1231 (Il1. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that a parent may be found unfit re-
gardless of whether she "did everything possible" to protect her children; the deter-
minative factors "should be the result of any efforts... rather than the mere fact that
an effort was made"). But see In re Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464, 468 (N.Y. Fain. Ct.
1992), where the mother actually fled the state to avoid physical abuse, called a local
child welfare agency and entered a battered women's shelter with her children. After
hearing about the mother's abuse at her trial, the court found that the abuse ren-
dered her incapable of protecting her children. Id. at 470.
' These are normally clemency projects whereby the governor's office establishes a
review mechanism to screen cases where women may have been unjustly convicted af-
ter being subjected to violence within the home or sentenced inappropriately by
courts that did not properly weigh the existence of violence within the home. For ex-
ample, the State of Florida has a two tier clemency process. Since clemency is nor-
mally granted only after the defendant has completed her sentence, a petition to
request a waiver must first be filed and then, if granted, the clemency petition can be
prepared. In recognition of the problems women faced in using battered women's
1998] 585
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murder of her child, she will not qualify for a clemency petition,
despite the fact that the death of the child was actually caused
by the same abuser the woman would have been justified in kill-
ing.37 This article suggests that the mother should be able to as-
sert that she is justified in not protecting the child because of
the risk of death or serious bodily injury to herself.
Criminal liability for these mothers is increasingly based on
a "failure to protect" or omissions theory. Ordinarily, a person
accused of a crime is required to commit a voluntary act (actus
reus) with a required state of mind (mens rea) before society will
attach criminal significance or liability to the person's behav-
ior.m There are crimes, however, which are either specifically
defined in terms of failure to perform some specified act or
failure to act when there is a legal duty to do so.! A parent's
syndrome as a defense at the trial level, procedures were adopted for the special han-
dling of applications for waiver effective January 1, 1995. In an application for clem-
ency, the woman and her advocate may appeal to the Governor's office for a release
from incarceration or a reduction in sentence. The inmate can demonstrate the exis-
tence of abuse through the clemency petition. At the trial level, this evidence may
have been excluded by the trial court. Or, it may not have been developed by de-
fense counsel. See Fla. Exec. Order No. 9-C-466 (1994); Fla. Exec. Order No. 92-92-80
(1992); Florida Battered Women's Clemency Project, Pro Bono Attorney Training
Manual (Apr. 1995) (unpublished manual, on file with author).
In other states either the governor or the Parole Board makes clemency determi-
nations. There are no national standards for processing clemency petitions. In fact,
not all states have established clemency projects. See NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR
THE DEFENSE OF BAT=ERED WOMEN, CLEMENCY ORGANIZING PRoJEcTs INFORMATION
PACKET 1 (1997).
' This creates a class of battered women in Florida that are not eligible to file for
clemency. The criteria for filing specifically state that the woman seeking assistance
of the Project must be:
a. Serving an active sentence
b. For a murder conviction
c. Of a significant other
d. Who has a claim of abuse... and
e. A tentative release date beyond December 31, 1997.
See Florida Battered Women's Clemency Project: Project Eligibility Policy 1 (1995)
(unpublished document, on file with author).
M WAYNE IK LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCO-r, JR., CRImNAL LAw 193 (2d ed. 1986). Ac-
cordingly, "bad thoughts alone cannot constitute a crime. There must be an act, or
an omission to act where there is a legal duty to act .... A bodily movement, to qual-
ify as an act forming the basis of criminal liability must be voluntary." Id. at 195. The
definition of an "act" has often been the subject of scholarly debate. For the purposes
of this article, an act is described as "an affirmative voluntary action undertaken by
the actor." I& at 197-99. The meaning of "voluntary" has caused its own its own de-
bate. I& at 198.
39 See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 453 (West 1990) (amending § 2M4.1 Military Service
Act § 3); ALA. CODE § 32-10-2 (1984); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-137 (West 1956);
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common law duty to her child falls into this category. Both par-
ents have a duty to clothe and feed their children and maintain
basic necessities.40 The parental duty to the child is, at least
theoretically, not without limit. A duty to act is limited initially
by the actor's ability to perform the expected act.41 The primary
issues for the parents are the extent and nature of the acts they
must perform to satisfy this duty. While a parent is expected to
expose herself to a greater degree of risk to save her child than
would a stranger,42 the parent is not required to risk death or se-
rious bodily injury.43 Parents are expected to take every step rea-
sonably possible to prevent harm to their children.4
. Though the law holds both parents to the same duty, society
particularly expects that the mother will be the child's protec-
tor. The mother is expected to suppress any individual identity
or needs of her own in order to serve and protect the needs of
her child.45 She is expected to use more than reasonable efforts
to protect her child, to do more than the law requires. She is
expected to use every effort. When a child dies through abuse at
the hands of someone other than the mother, and the state de-
termines that the mother failed to take reasonable steps to save
her child, the mother can be prosecuted for "failure to protect."
There appears to be no discussion in the cases of what consti-
tutes "every reasonable" step possible to satisfy the duty to 
act.46
wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (failure to register for the draft); Burnett
v. State, 494 So. 2d 200 (Ala. Grim. App. 1986) (leaving the scene of an accident-
failure to report); State v. Averyt, 876 P.2d 1158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (failure to file in-
come tax).
4 LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 38, at 208-09.
4' &L Just as one cannot be held criminally liable for bodily movement that is in-
voluntary, one cannot be held criminally liable for failing to do an act which she is
physically incapable of doing. I&. at 209 (providing an example of a father who can-
not swim and the law's reluctance to require that he jump into a pool in order to save
his drowning child).42 id.
' Id. See also State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982) (advising that requiring
parents to place themselves in danger of death or great bodily harm in carrying out
their common law duty to their children would require bravery beyond what can be
expected).
4 Walden, 293 S.E.2d at 786.
4' See infra Part IA for a discussion of societal views of motherhood.
46 The severity of a court's interpretation of "every reasonable" step is demon-
strated in New Mexico v. Lucero, 647 P.2d 406 (N.M. 1982) (holding failure to rescue a
child from abuse by a partner is a strict liability crime; establishing mens rea is not re-
quired, all the state need do is demonstrate harm to the child). A full discussion of
Lucero appears infra note 292.
1998]
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The unspoken assumption may be that the mother can end the
abuse by simply picking up the phone and calling the police.
Such assumptions ignore the realities of violence by the signifi-
cant other. By making such assumptions, the courts are in fact
requiring that mothers risk serious bodily injury or death before
their duty to act is satisfied.
Societal views of mothers, children and violence, combined
with gendered legal assumptions, contribute to an environment
which is hostile to claims of a defense for battered mothers. In
Part I of this article, I examine the multiple expectations that
society and the law has of mothers. Initially I set forth societal
requirements for women who are mothers. Secondly, I explore
societal reactions to domestic violence. Next, I review society's
understanding of child abuse, pointing out the tension between
policies that were aimed exclusively towards protecting children,
at all costs, from violence in the home and policies developed to
protect women from violence in the home. Through an analysis
of child protective policy I demonstrate that gendered assump-
tions about women's obligations to their children are embed-
ded in the law and hinder battered mothers' ability to present
defenses. Finally, I highlight the dilemmas the law has with
evaluating victim status of battered women and mothers. The
expectation that a mother will and should, at all costs and be-
yond what is simply reasonable, sacrifice everything for her child
will be made apparent.
Part II of this article explores how the law on murder liabil-
ity through a failure to protect analysis developed. I trace the
development of the historical interest the state has for the wel-
fare of its children. Throughout that development there were
periods of time when civic-minded people engaged in cam-
paigns to save children from bad home environments. The fac-
tors which contributed to a home being labeled as "bad" were
often influenced by class and race. I draw a connection be-
tween the historical movements to save children and the mod-
em failure to protect statutes.
In Part III, I critique the application of omissions or failure
to protect theory of murder liability for battered mothers. Un-
der an omissions theory, it is the failure to act to prevent inju-
ries or preserve life which serves as the basis for liability. In
" See infra discussion of domestic violence in Part 1B.
[Vol. 88
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order for murder liability to attach to the mother, the state
must: (1) demonstrate a connection between the affirmative act
of the abuser, the mother's failure to act, and the death of the
child; (2) establish an appropriate mens rea for the mother;48 and
(3) demonstrate she was capable of performing an act which
would have saved her child. I question whether the analyses
above can be made properly without considering how battering
affects the mother.
The issue of whether battered women's behavior is reason-
able continues to be problematic for theorists. In Part IV, I ex-
amine the issue of standards of reasonableness. The ability of
public and legal institutions to evaluate the behavior of battered
mothers as reasonable is hampered by the failure to recognize
the prevalence of violence within the home. I encourage legal
scholars, jurists and lawyers to continue to struggle towards an
understanding that the behavior of battered mothers who do
not save their children may be reasonable. Finally in Part V, I
propose an agenda for change. I recommend that several theo-
retical principles of criminal law be re-examined as insufficient
scholarly attention has been devoted to the impact of the theo-
ries upon women. I suggest that the actions of some battered
mothers may be justified according to standard criminal law
theory. And, rather than seeing the mother's behavior as de-
monic, insane, reckless or neglectful, we should recognize it for
what it may actually be: reasonable behavior based on factors
known to the mother at the time of the child's death or injury.
I also urge thatjudicial monitoring and training continue to en-
sure judges apply evidentiary and procedural rules in a consis-
tent, non-biased manner. My third and last recommendation is
that feminist scholars make better use of the political process to
highlight the legal problems of this margainalized group of bat-
tered women.
I. SOCIETY'S VIEWS OF MOTHERHOOD AND CHILD ABUSE
It is horrifying to see mothers killing their children... The life and comfort of one's
child should come above all else.49
' The mens rea requirement in failure to protect cases can run from requiring in-
tentional conduct to strict liability.
"' See Lauyer's Remark on Verdict an Outrage, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 22, 1995, at 19A
(commenting that first degree murder verdict was not too severe).
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All she ever wanted was to be a mother: a "good one" with patience, pride in her family,
love of her husband and children.0
A. SOCIETY'S VIEW OF MOTHERHOOD
The public and legal reaction to Pauline Zile is intricately
related to societal concepts of women and their responsibilities
as mothers. Social concepts of motherhood are complex.
While motherhood itself is highly honored,5 society does not
generally value the women who become mothers.2 For much of
our history, mothers were not considered important aside from
the influence they had on their children.53 The status of moth-
erhood was and is still seen not only as the ultimate but also as
the only fulfillment of womanhood." Failure to achieve the
status can and does generate a negative effect. 5 There are sev-
eral expectations that form the dominant ideology of mother-
hood 6  First, motherhood is understood as the "natural,
'o Letter from Pauline Yingling, Pauline Zile's mother, to the court (Apr. 23, 1995)
(on file with author).
" See, e.g., Catherine McBride-Chang et al., Mother Blaming Psychology and the Law, 1
S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 69 (1992).
12 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWAL. REv. 95 (1993) (alleging
that society assigns women the responsibility of childbearing, but does not pay women
for the labor it entails while degrading that labor at the same time); see also M.M.
Slaughter, The Legal Construction of 'Mother," in MOTHERS IN LAW 73, 73-74, 80 (Martha
A. Feinman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995) (analyzing the valuation of Ideal Workers ver-
sus Mothers, and arguing that Mothers are not valued by society because their labor is
domestic and not viewed as contributing to production of wealth).
" McBride-Chang et al., supra note 51, at 71. The authors note that, while mothers
were seen as causing negative behaviors in their children, they were not usually seen
as causing any positive behaviors. Id. "Momism," a term coined by Phillip Wylie,
blamed mothers not only for the problems of their own children, but for the prob-
lems of the whole society as well. Id.
" See Robbin S. Ogle et al., A Theory of Homicidal Behavior Among Women, 33
CRIMINOLOGY 173, 179 (1995); see also Martha A. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty
Discourse, in MOTHERS iN LAW, supra note 52, at 205, 207 (construction of motherhood
is so interwoven in our culture that it affects all women independent of whether or
not they choose to become mothers).
55 Id.
' See Marlee Kline, Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare Law and First
Nation Women, in MOTHERS IN LAW, supra note 52, at 118, 119; see also Fineman, supra
note 54, at 205-23. Fineman defines ideology as a system constituted by a collection
of symbols, beliefs and assumptions that, in combination, rationalize and give mean-
ing to discourses in the context of power. Fineman, supra note 54, at 219. A domi-
nant ideology is relatively stable although it alters over time, in response to tensions
generated by too violent or prolonged demands from discourses without power. Id.
at 220.
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desired and ultimate goal of all normal women."57  Also in-
cluded within the dominant ideology is the nature of good be-
haviors expected of "good mothers'-that they will be available
to the children, spend time with them, love and care for them
physically, and be responsible for the cleanliness of the home
environment. 8 A mother's own wants and needs, apart from
those of her children, are never considered. However, "to the
extent that society values women's roles as mothers, it does so
only when the events of motherhood attach to a legal father."5 9
A "good mother," therefore, is expected to be in a family that is
nuclear, heterosexual and that has a man (whom the mother
married) as head of the house.6 Finally, the ideal of mother-
hood is also culturally specific, in that it reflects the normative
value of white, middle class, 61 Anglo-European society.62 Not all
women are entitled to share in the "natural, desired and ulti-
mate goal" of motherhood. Historically, women of color, poor
women, lesbians, immigrant and unmarried women have been
defined as "unfit" to carry the banner of motherhood.63 For
57 Kline, supra note 56, at 119.
"Id.
'9 See Roberts, supra note 52, at 95. Fineman points out a Wisconsin statute that
may possibly subject a mother to criminal prosecution if she does not assist the state
in establishing paternity for her child, even when the child will not be on the state
welfare rolls. The legislature of Wisconsin declared that every child has a "legal right
to have a father." Fineman, supra note 54, at 214, 221; id. at 221-23.
Kline, supra note 56, at 120.
"Id. See also Roberts, supra note 52, at 108.
" Some scholars argue that the ideology of motherhood is tied to historic notions
of western capitalist nations of the early 19th century, in that the "good mother" re-
mained at home with the children and did not enter the gritty workplace of newly in-
dustrialized nations. Kline, supra note 56, at 120. Modem economies have tempered
the ideology to the extent that some version of the working mother is now acceptable.
The dominant theory, however, still does not envision a working class mother working
full-time to support her family. Id.
"See Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1993).
Historically, black motherhood has been devalued and discouraged, principally to
disregard and subordinate blacks. Id. at 11. Roberts also argues that single mother-
hood is regarded as pathological, an explanation for poverty, and a facilitator for
governmental intrusion into the lives of single mothers that would otherwise be ille-
gal. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Unrealized Power of Mother, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
141 (1995). There is a similar castigation of lesbian mothers. Because they violate
the traditional gender norm and reject the historically subordinated position of the
female role, lesbian mothers are characterized as "outlaw mothers." See BETH E.
RICHIE, COMPELLTED TO CRiME: GENDER ENTRAPMENT OF BATTERED BLACK WOMEN 2-3
(1996); Jenny Wald, Outlaw Mothers, 8 HASTINGS WOM:EN'S LJ. 169 (1997); see also
Naomi R. Cahn, Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95 MIcR. L.
REv. 965 (1997) (detailing how welfare is presently constructed to mean race); Doro-
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these women procreation has been devalued and discouraged,
as these women are deemed unworthy of the privileges of
motherhood.6e Society considers women who fail to meet the
ideal of motherhood as deviant or criminal.
Despite recent changes in the structure and economics of
family life, the burdens of raising children still fall primarily on
women. They are the ones most penalized by limited availability
of child care services and the lack of resources committed to se-
curing child-support payments.66 As a result, mothers and chil-
dren-particularly mothers of color and their children-
increasingly predominate in the ranks of the poor.67
thy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equity, and the
Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1436-44 (1991) [hereinafter Roberts, Punish-
ingDrugAddicts].
" See Kline, supra note 56, at 121; see also JOEL HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE
REFORM (1995) (historical analysis of the characteristics of the unworthy poor). The
historic view that poor women are unworthy is mirrored in the current debate on wel-
fare reform. HANDLER, supra, at 28-29. At the same time that conservative politicians
decry the deterioration of "family values"-implying that such deterioration is caused
by the increasing number of selfish women entering the workforce rather than stay-
ing at home with their children-mothers on welfare are criticized for attempting to
stay home with their preschool aged children. The mother on welfare is not entitled
to participate in the dominant ideology of motherhood which allows her to nurture
her children. See also Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 63, at 1442-44 (de-
tailing historical denial of Black Women's right to bear children through forced ster-
ilization and transferring stereotype of unworthy blacks to modem stereotype of the
lazy welfare mother); Fineman, supra note 54, at 211.
6' Roberts, supra note 52, at 5 (noting that legal rules reward conduct that fulfills a
woman's maternal role and punishes conduct that conflicts with mothering). Fine-
man notes that single motherhood is often viewed as "dangerous" and even "deadly"
not only to those who are single mothers and their children, but society as a whole.
Fineman, supra note 54, at 214.
Ogle et al., supra note 54, at 179.
67 Id (citing BUREAU OF CENSUS, MEDIAN INCOME LEVELS BY Sax (1988); NATIONAL
CENTER FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, HOUSEHOLD STATISTICS ON FAMILIES AND POVERTY
RATE (1987)). The disparity between children of color and white children similarly
situated was pointed out by Senator Moynihan when he compared children sup-
ported by survivor's benefit insurance (under social security) and children whose
mothers received AFDC. He noted that survivor's benefit insurance had increased by
53% while the benefits of children on AFDC had decreased by 138%. The only dif-
ference between the children was that those on survivor's benefits were white and
their mothers enjoyed the privilege of marriage, while the children on AFDC were
primarily children of color born or raised by single mothers. Id See Fineman, supra
note 54, at 212.
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B. SOGIETh"S VIEW OF CHILD ABUSE
In light of society's views about mothers, it is not surprising
to find that child abuse is primarily viewed as a female crime.'
Women are considered responsible for child abuse whether
they directly commit the abusive acts or fail to prevent the abuse
of others. Health care professionals and society as a whole have
traditionally believed that mothers who abused or permitted
abuse were "sick" women.69 Few attempts were made by social
scientists to correlate the incidence of child abuse with other
factors, such as poverty, lack of health care or benefits, lack of
support services or the existence of violent fathers or other in-
timates within the home.0 In reality, child abuse is not exclu-
sively a female crime. It may not even be primarily a female
crime. Studies which focus specifically on the gendered analysis
of child abuse are beginning to indicate the extent of male par-
ticipation in child abuse. Sample surveys indicate that fathers
may be as likely as or more likely than mothers to abuse chil-
dren.' One survey estimates that 40% of children in a national
See Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcraft, Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist Perspec-
tive-on Child Abuse, 18 INT'LJ. HEALTH SERvicEs 97, 98 (1988) (even work that consid-
ers the gender aspects of child abuse accepts the claim that child abuse is a female
crime). Men are of course primarily and routinely charged with sexual abuse of chil-
dren. However, even when the male perpetrates the sexual abuse, the courts will ask
why the mother permitted the abuse. See also Howard A. Davidson, Child Abuse and
Domestic Violence: Legal Connections and Controversies, 29 FAM. L.Q. 357, 364 (1995) (at-
torney stated that in 16 years of practice she had never seen a father charged with fail-
ing to protect). The absence of a body of case law defining fathers' and stepfathers'
liability is all the more interesting as women were believed at one time to be primarily
responsible for child abuse. If the obligations of parenthood as reflected by failure to
protect laws were being applied in a gender neutral manner, one would expect to see
a substantial body of cases evaluating liability for fathers.
"9 Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 68, at 98; see also Suzanne P. Starling et al., Abusive
Head Trauma: The Relationship of Perpetrators to their Vctims, 95 PEDIATRICS 259-60
(1997) (early reports suggested that women were most often perpetrators of fatal
child abuse). However, even though society deplores child abuse, it tolerates infanti-
cide. See Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming To Terms With Modern American
Infanticide, 34 AM. CGRM. L. REv. 1 (1996) (pointing out that society decries the act but
sympathizes with the mother, as is evidenced by lenient sentencing in cases of infanti-
cide). But see Roberts, supra note 52, at 107-08 (indicating only middle class white
women get the sympathy).
71 Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 68, at 98 (acknowledging that while a significant mi-
nority of cases where child abuse occurs have multi-problem backgrounds, the typical
context for child abuse is a battering relationship where the woman can exercise little
control over the violent behavior of the intimate).
71 Id. at 99. See also Starling et al., supra note 69, at 260 (citing a 1986 study finding
that fathers are 2.2 times more likely than mothers to be perpetrators of abuse result-
ing in permanent injury or death). In Starling et al.'s studies of abusive head
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survey were abused by their fathers,H while another survey
found that males are the assailants in 55% of reported cases of
child abuse. 5 A 1986 study indicates that the number of hospi-
talized cases has not declined, and the proportion of severe in-
juries has increased as has the proportion of known male
perpetrators reported.74 Similarly, the proportion of female
perpetrators decreased from 32% to 20% in all cases and from
20% to 6% in severe cases.75 A correlation can be drawn be-
tween the increase in the number of cases with known male
perpetrators and the decrease in the number of cases attribut-
able to women or categorized as unknown. 76 More recent stud-
ies, controlled to detect differences specifically based on
gender, found that single fathers had higher abuse rates than
did single mothers.7
Men, either as fathers or significant others, are invisible in
the traditional analysis of child abuse. Male invisibility is evi-
denced by the lack of scholarly information focusing on the sub-
ject of male child abuse.7s Men are also invisible in programs
for abusing parents, which tend to focus on developing appro-
trauma-also known as shaken baby syndrome-fathers and mothers' boyfriends ac-
counted for 57.5% of the occurrences of abuse, while mothers accounted only for
12.6%. Id.
DAVID D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN: PHYSICAL ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES
116 (1970).
71 See Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 68, at 99. Stark and Flitcraft cite the AMERICAN
HuMANE Soc'y, NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF OFFIciAL CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORTING
(1978), and then contrast it with E. BAHER ET AL, AT RISK AN ACcOuNT OF THE WORK
OF THE BATTERED CHILD RESEARCH DEPARTMENT (1976) (National Society for the Pre-
vention to Children), a smaller study where the number was placed at 25%. Stark
and Flitcraft believe that even a level of 25% is extraordinary considering the division
of labor between men and women gives women almost exclusive child-rearing re-
sponsibilities. Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 68, at 99.
74 Stark & Fltcraft, supra note 68, at 98. The numbers rose from 38% to 49% for all
cases and from 30% to 64% for severe cases. Additionally, from 1989 to 1993, the
percentage of infants abused by men nearly doubled. Starling et al., supra note 69, at
260.
75 Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 68, at 99.
76 I& at 100.
' Glenn D. Wolfner & RichardJ. Gelles, A Profile of Violence Toward Children: A Na-
tional Study, 17 CHiLD ABUSE & NEGLECT 197-212 (1993); Richard J. Gelles, Child Abuse
and Violence in Single Parent Families, 59 AMER.J. ORTHOPSyCHATRY 492-501 (1989).
78 Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 68, at 102. The authors indicate that previous
searches only yielded two articles which spoke of male child abusers and that no stud-
ies controlled for gender. Id. at 101. The use of the phrase "abusing parent" is often
a euphemism for mother. Id-
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priate gender behavior, such as mother-child bonding.7 If a
man harms a child, the mother is often blamed for not being
present or for allowing others to care for the child while she
worksl Traditionally, and still even today, there is no broad
based belief that fathers have the same level of responsibility for
the care of their children as do mothers.8 ' Echoes of these sen-
timents can be found very clearly in the judicial opinions con-
demning women whose children have been killed by intimate
others.82
Despite the fact that women are not solely responsible for
child abuse, stereotypic and patronizing images of women stub-
bornly remain among experts in the child abuse field."s Child
79 1& at 102. See also Starling et al., supra note 69, at 261 (pointing out that current
abuse prevention methods are largely targeted at young and expectant mothers and
questioning whether prevention methods will be successful if programs are not estab-
lished to target the fathers, stepfathers, and boyfriends).
80 See Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 68, at 101; see also People v. Peters, 586 N.E.2d
469 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (mother held liable for knowledge of abuse that occurred
while she was at work). Compare the treatment of the mothers to David Schwarz,
whom the state excused from liability because he was "on the road" a lot during the
period of abuse. SeeFolks, A.J. Case Haunts Father, supra note 26, at lB.
8, See Roberts, supra note 52, at 100 n.24 (citing Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and
Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1415 (1991) (recognizing
that courts view women as "draftees" and men as "volunteers" to parenthood); Janet
L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L REv. 637, 648
(1993) (noting the law's treatment of the father's social relationship to their children
as a cultural creation and choice, "not an automatic correlate of a biological ties");
Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 996-97 (1984)
(indicating that courts treat fathering in terms of "opportunity" and mothering in
terms of "responsibility")).
82 In many of the cases where the father, stepfather or paramour killed the child,
the mother worked more than one job while the active abuser did not work at all.
The mother was sometimes engaged in other legitimate activity at the time of the fatal
injury. See, e.g., Phelps v. State, 439 So. 2d 727 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (mother had
taken another child to the hospital and stayed with that child on the night her son
was killed by her boyfriend). But see Cardwell v. State, 461 So. 2d 754 (Miss. 1984)
(where mother's conviction is upheld but stepfather's reversed because he was work-
ing at time of the fatal injury).
See Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separa-
tion, 90 McH. L REv. 1, 27 (1991) (stating that, even though a feminist approach to
child abuse has developed in the social sciences, there is still a reluctance to attribute
violence within the home exclusively to the abuser). Gender neutral approaches to
violence infer that both the abuser and victim are equally to blame for the incidents
of violence within the home.
Among feminist legal scholars, conflicting opinions over women and the role of
biology in setting limitations for women has hindered the development of a feminist
working theory on child abuse. See Marie Ashe & Naomi Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem
for Feminist Theory, 2 TEx.J. WOMEN & L 75 (1993). Professors Ashe and Cahn discuss
the strands of feminist theory that have developed. They note that cultural feminism,
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abuse is alternatively interpreted as a failure or an exaggerated
maternal function, a lack of parenting skills, or an inappropri-
ate resentment on the mother's part of the vulnerability of her
child.84
Child abuse policies have been formulated by workers who
have an inherent bias against mothers.8s The total fixation on
the child's interests alone cause the workers to make determina-
tions about the child's best interest without reference to contex-
tual reality.& These actions can lead the workers and the child's
legal representatives to argue that the child should be removed
from the mother, despite the fact that the mother and the child
have a real emotional attachment and despite the fact that the
state may be unable to provide an adequate alternative place-
ment for the child."' The child victims in these situations are
which embraces the imagery of mothers as nurturers, has difficulty with mothers who
abuse or allow their children to be abused. These mothers cannot be described as
nurturers-they are "bad" mothers. Id. at 103-05. Liberal feminists, on the other
hand, were more concerned with individual autonomy and fulfillment of personal
ambitions. Liberal feminists did not devote much theoretical attention to the prob-
lem of mothers who might be overwhelmed by childrearing responsibilities. Id. at
101-03. Radical feminists reject the idea that a woman's fate or identity is controlled
by biology. They too devoted little theoretical discussion to the examination of "bad"
mothers. After being criticized for the failure to incorporate the problems of women
who are also mothers into their theoretical work, radical feminists are beginning to
look at issues such as the prosecution of drug addicted mothers. Id at 105-07. Post
modern feminists attempt to demonstrate the complexities of women's existence by
reference to subjective factors of their lives, such as using women's narratives in the
theoretical work. Under post modern feminism, more attention is being given to the
"bad" mother, if only to make clear that she exists and needs legal theories to help
explain her reality to the legal world. Id. at 107-09. See also WilliamJ. Turner et al.,
Cultural Feminism and Redistributive Justice, 45 AM. U. L. REy. 1275, 1279-99 (1996);
Marie Ashe, Bad Mothers, Good Lawyers, and Legal Ethics, 81 GEO. LJ. 2533 (1993);
Marie Ashe, The Bad Mother in Law and Literature: A Problem of Representation, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1992); Patricia A. Gain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA.
L. REV. 803, 829-41 (1990).
See Stark & Flitcraft, supra note 68, at 109.
SId at 113.
Id. at 109. "Mary Francis," a poem by Gwendolyn Brooks, provides a child's per-
spective of domestic violence:
Home is a shape before me. I travel three blocks to Home, Are the dishes in the
sink, still, with the morning yellow dried on? And is there another color in the
kitchen? (The kitchen is where he whips her.) Is red all over Mama once again?
Is pa still Home, with a mean and sliding mouth? With hands like hams. With
stares that are scissors, tornadoes.
Gwendolyn Brooks, May Francis, quoted in Bernardine Dohm, Bad Mothers, Good Moth-
ers, and the State: Children on the Margins, 2 U. CH. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1 (1995).
87 See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of
Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM.
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frequently described as innocent S -indicating however subtly
that the mother is not. Although we can forgive or maybe ex-
cuse the mother for remaining in a violent relationship, on
some level we may still view her as an implicit agent in her own
abuse. We cannot forgive or excuse her for failing to prevent
the abuse or death of her child. If forced to compete for the
sympathies and interest of the public, a totally innocent child
trumps a battered woman any day. We find this sentiment ex-
pressed, though not in those tenns, in the works of Alice Miller,
a Swiss psychologist. As Miller points out, "[t]he situation of
an adult woman confronted by a brutal man is not the same as
that of a small child."9° Miller's work has been quoted by some
feminists as well, who seek to explain why it is appropriate to
hold the mothers criminally responsible for failure to protect.
For example, Professor Mary Becker advocates that:
Adults in a household should be responsible for injury to the child if
they knew or should have known about the abuse and could have taken
steps to prevent the abuse by leaving with the children or reporting the
abuse to the authorities. The assumption should be that the adult who
was not literally a hostage-not literally coerced at every available sec-
ond-could have acted to end abuse. Although the adult might have
found herself or himself in circumstances such that protection of the
child seemed impossible, the child is still a child. No matter how weak
the mother, she is in a much better position than the child to prevent
abuse and owes a duty of care to her children."
L.Q. 121 (1995). The recent history of foster care centered on a policy of removing
children from unsafe environments. The policies resulted in what became known as
"foster care drift"-children who spent significant periods of time drifting from
placement to placement. Id at 122. Criticism of the system led to reforms such as
the 1980 Federal Adoption Assistance & Child Welfare Act. However, Guggenheim's
study of the effects of the Act 15 years later indicated the well-intentioned reform ef-
forts have caused the unnecessary destruction of families and created a class of legal
orphans. Id. at 134.
Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support Sys-
tems, Custody Outcomes and Liability for Acts of Others, 2 U. Cm. L. Sca-. ROUNDTABLE 13,
21 (1995).
" ALICF MILLER, BANISHED KNOWLEDGE: FACING CHILDHOOD INJUlRES (Leila
Vennewitz trans., Doubleday, 1st ed. 1990) (1988).
9"Id. at 77.
9" Becker, supra note 88, at 21. Becker, as well as other feminists who echo this ar-
gument seem heavily influenced by Alice Miller, who writes movingly of the effects of
abuse on children in her book. Becker concludes that "[u]nless we are willing to rec-
ognize a general diminished capacity defense.., criminal liability is appropriate." Id.
at 21-22. However, she acknowledges that incapacity, duress and insanity are hard to
prove and generally are not defenses that are successfully used. Id. at 22. See supra
discussion of incapacity and duress in Part III; see also Elizabeth Schneider, Resistance
to Equality, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv. 477 (1996) (pointing out that misunderstandings and
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Professor Becker's language echoes the language of some
court opinions holding abused mothers liable for failing to pro-
tect their children.92 By focusing exclusively on what is happen-
ing to the child-without considering the full context of how
the abuser's violence affects every member of the household-
agencies perpetuate the continuance of violence within intimate
space. Blaming the mother avoids the necessity of examining
the ways in which the courts, police and public unwillingness to
address the issue of violence within the home contributes to the
ongoing empowerment of the abuser.93 The image presented of
the mother of abused children is that she does not care about or
take seriously her personal circumstances and how they affect
her children.94 Therefore, it is easy to reach the conclusion that
limited information about the experiences of battered women lead some feminists to
advocate that battered women take an "either-or" approach to formulating a defense
rather than allowing them the full range of defenses) [hereinafter Schneider, Resis-
tance]. There is tension in Becker's work as she states: "[A]nd even were we to recog-
nize such a defense in other contexts, its application would be troubling here, where
the crime is injury to a child who is more vulnerable than the defendant and whose
life has been ended or permanently damaged by the defendant's action or inaction."
Becker, supra note 88, at 22. She notes that such liability is likely to be imposed in a
gendered, raced and class conscious way given biases in our culture, yet appears will-
ing to accept disparate treatment to save the child. Id.
A similar argument, made to the Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987), asserts that racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty can-
not be remedied because of the systematic bias in our culture. This is a disconcerting
argument, particularly for a feminist. See also Schneider, Resistance, supra, at 487
(criticizing feminists for not analyzing issues in terms of gender parity); Dorothy E.
Roberts, The Meaning of Gender Equality in Criminal Law, 85J. GRIM. L. & CRIMNOLOGY
1, 3-4 (1994) (encouraging feminists to be mindful of the ways race and class affect
gendered analyses).
People v. Novy, 597 N.E.2d 273, 295-96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
" See Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 515 A.2d 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Julia Card-
well was charged with "violating a duty of care, protection and/or support" due to her
failure to "protect" her daughter from her husband's repeated sexual abuse. Id. at
313. When Cardwell learned of the abuse she moved with her daughter into her par-
ent's home, transferred her daughter to a distant school, and wrote to her husband
alerting him that she knew of the abuse and would not tolerate it. I& at 315-16. Her
husband continued to abuse the daughter. Despite testimony outlining his abuse of
Julia and the fear that she and her daughter had of him, the court noted that Julia's
duty to protect her daughter was not discharged by ineffectual action. I& Moreover,
the court stated that her actions could not reasonably be expected to protect her
daughter's safety, and thus resulted in a failure to protect her daughter. Id.
'4 See Fineman, supra note 54, at 213 (citing AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, TE
NEW CONSENSUS ON FAMILY AND WELFARE: A COMMuNrTY OF SELF-RELIANCE REPORT
(1987), which concludes that poverty, crime and drugs are results of poor people fail-
ing to prepare themselves). Fineman also uses as an example a newspaper colum-
nist's op-ed essay entitled, "Illegitimacy Biggest Killer of Our Babies." Id. at 215. See
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she is somehow deviant or unfit because she keeps her children
in a household where there is violence. The service provider's
inquiry may go no further. The agency, psychologist or lawyer is
not required to ask whether the mother had an alternative to
remaining in a violent household. The fact that no alternatives
exist is irrelevant.95 In fact, legal, social service practice, and
psychological theory all hold women responsible for child abuse
even when a male assailant is clearly identified and is also batter-
ing the mother.9
At the other end of the spectrum, some feminist scholars
are reluctant to attribute any blame to the mother for a child's
injury or death at the hands of a violent intimate. The reluc-
tance to do so is bound up in the unwillingness to allow chil-
dren (their existence and relationship to women) to define
women's actions, status or conditions of existence.98 They seek
to free women from permanent attachment to the status of
mother, thereby eliminating what can be viewed as a major
component of the oppression of women.9
Both approaches are acontextual. To deny that harm has
been done to the children by the mother forces the mother's
advocate to represent her as the "good" mother to gain the
court's and the public's sympathy, understanding and trust.1°°
This position is troublesome. A "good" mother would never
find herself in a situation where she was being abused, and even
if she did, she would never "allow" her children to be abused.
As more becomes known about the plight of children living
within violent homes, the feminist legal community has been
conflicted in its theoretical examination of the ties between
mothers who have either actively abused their children or who
also Joanne Jacobs, llegitimacy Biggest Killer of Our Babies, WIs. ST. J., Feb. 9, 1990, at
11A.
9- See Kline, supra note 56, at 126 (citing KB. v. Alberta Director of Child Welfare (A.J.
No. 840 [1992] [Q.L.]), where the judge admonished mother to overcome "her prob-
lems with... relationships with abusive men").
9SeeStark & Flitcraft, supra note 68, at 101.
9Ashe & Cahn, supra note 83, at 101-09.
"Mahoney, supra note 83, at 46 (noting liberal feminist legal reforms fought to
make motherhood less central to women's identities).
"Ashe & Cahn, supra note 83, at 101-09; see also SUSAN SCmCTmR, WOMEN AND
MALE VIOLENCE 323-25 (1982) (advocating against merging the battered women's
shelter movement into child protective agencies; problems of child abuse were be-
lieved to have different origins than the problems of battered women).
"0 SeeAshe & Cahn, supra note 83, at 112.
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have failed to protect children from known abusers.1 1 This con-
flict and the silence which it generates is quite apparent when
viewed in contrast to the activity of feminists in the development
of laws and theories to help women who have been raped 0 2 or
who have themselves been battered in the home.0 3 It has been
suggested that the silence may be partially attributable to the
absence of a compelling female adult victim in the failure to
protect cases.1M The cultural orientation and pressure to place
10' See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist The-
oy and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L REV. 520, 551-52 (1992) [herein-
after Schneider, Particularity and Generality] (discussing the split in the feminist
community over support for Hedda Nussbaum, the battered mother of Lisa Steinberg
who was killed by Joel Steinberg).
102 The very concept of "date rape" and the development of laws to criminalize it is
a product of feminist efforts to name a type of violent assault that was traditionally
viewed as acceptable male behavior. Mahoney, supra note 83, at 6 n.25. The so-called
rape shield laws, which prohibit the defense from inquiring into a rape victim's past
sexual experiences, were similarly spearheaded by women's advocates. See Beverly Ba-
los & Mary L. Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trhst: Nonstranger Rape, 75 MINN. L. REV.
599, 600 (1991).
10' Concepts such as "battered" woman and Battered Women's Syndrome (BWS)
were unknown before the women's movement brought them to the attention of the
courts. See SCHECrER, supra note 99, at 157-69. Although concepts such as BWS have
been criticized for having theoretical gaps as well as for essentializing women who are
battered, the fact that conditions of battered women were named at all created a chal-
lenge to the legal system to re-evaluate its treatment of women trapped in such rela-
tionships. See Mahoney, supra note 83, at 71.
104 The feminist reluctance to endorse the victimhood of the battered mother of a
battered child surfaced in Susan Brownmiller's comments that Hedda Nussbaum
should share some liability with Joel Steinberg, an abusive father who killed their
adopted daughter, despite the fact she herself was severely abused by him. See
Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 101, at 551. Schneider states that the
"'victim' description seems most accurate to the battered woman's experience ....
Yet, the woman's role as mother makes characterizing her as a victim far more prob-
lematic." Id. at 552. Moreover "mothers are expected to transcend their victimiza-
tion, to act on behalf of their children regardless of their own situations." Id. The
critique of radical feminism's failure to consider mother's issues led radical feminists
to examine the problems of drug addicted mothers. The mothers were then identi-
fied as "victims" despite radical feminism's rejection of the victim analysis. Asche &
Cahn, supra note 83, at 107.
The tensions produced within the feminist community by the desire to have a
compelling victim have surfaced in other areas, for example, in the debates about
pornography. See, e.g,Joan Kennedy Taylor, Does Sexual Speech Harm Women?: The Split
Within Feminism, 5 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 49 (1994); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Catharine's
Wheel: Mackinnon s Pornography Analysis as a Return to Traditional Christian Sexual Theory,
38 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 225 (1993); Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The" Feminist
Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REv. 1099 (1993). In the debate on prostitution, see,
e.g., Alexandra Bongard Stremler, Sex For Money and The Morning After:. Listening to
Women and The Feminist Voice in Prostitution Discourse, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. PoL'y 189
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total responsibility on the mother seems overwhelming. When
faced with two individuals who might compete for the title of
victim, even some feminists will pick the child as being the
"truly" innocent person and therefore deserving the title.10 5 We
are backed into this choice because of the insistence of relying
on the dichotomy of victim versus independent agent.16 What is
the feminist theoretical view of women who are both victims and
agents, who want to be seen as reasonable, but at the same time
commit acts which even women find difficult to understand?
10 7
It would seem that courts have more readily accepted the view
that battered women are victims, as opposed to agents. There
are legitimate reasons why a court would be attracted to charac-
terizing women as victims. "The stories of victims are attractive
because they arouse attractive emotions .... [t]here is an ele-
mental moral requirement to respond to innocent suffering. If
we were not to respond to it and its claim upon us, we would be
without conscience, and in some basic sense, not completely
human."' 8 Through hearing the stories, the listeners in a sense
possess some of the victims' lives, and the sense of possession
can engender a sense of one's capacity to respond, whether or
not that capacity is exercised in any practical way.10 Professor
Minow states that "victimhood is attractive then because it se-
(1994); Margaret A. Baldwin, Strategies of Connection: Prostitution and Feminist Politics, 1
MIcH.J. GENDER& L. 65 (1993).105 Society has frequently required that the underdog be deserving of our sympathy
and support. See HA4DLER, supra note 64, at 20-31. Children are traditionally consid-
ered deserving, as are widows and retirees. Single mothers, working mothers, and
women of color have never been viewed as deserving. Id at 22-23. Consequently, the
courts are willing to see failure to protect as ongoing deviance by the same women
who had already been deemed undeserving of the court's or society's sympathy, tol-
erance or understanding.
6 This is not a new problem for feminists but has been an ongoing one as the
movement struggles to define battering and continues to refine our understanding of
violence towards women. See Schneider, supra note 101, at 549. Should a woman who
is battered be viewed as a victim who is weak and unable to help herself, or is she an
independent actor, capable of making reasoned choices? The view of woman as vic-
tim makes the courageous and sometimes heroic effort women make to survive under
violent circumstances invisible. However, woman as independent agent makes a diffi-
cult sell for ajury who will ask why she didn't leave. See also Martha Mahoney, Victimi-
zation or Oppression?: Women's Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF
PuVATEVIOLENCE 59, 74 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykituk eds., 1994).
"7 See Marie Ashe, Postmodernism, Legal Ethics, and Representations of "Bad Mothers," in
MoTHERS iN LAw, supra note 52, at 142, 152-54 (1995) (describing the difficulty and
ambivalence of representing mothers charged with child abuse).
Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1141, 1413 (1993).
"9 Id. at 1414.
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cures attention from otherwise disinterested people. Victim-
hood can solicit expressions and acts of sympathy, relieve re-
sponsibility, promote a sense of solidarity, and cultivate
compassion whether or not it is acted upon.""10
However, part of the problem of victimhood is that it per-
petuates counter-victim talk,"' and it suppresses the strengths
and capacities of people who are victims." 2 This presents a di-
lemma for feminist theory in the areas of violence in the
home."3 Part of the dilemma, as Professor Mahoney sees it, is
that the law requires a dichotomous nature that does not exist."
4
On the one hand, the law perceives victimization as a unilateral
exercise of power: harm imposed on the victim who is without
strength. However, agency implies freedom from victimiza-
tion."" Neither concepts of agency nor concepts of victimiza-
tion fully take account of women's experiences of oppression
and resistance in relationships.' 6 Early calls were made to reject
the "all victim" or "all agent" approach to women's experiences,
particularly as these terms relate to the experiences of battered
women."7 The concern was well warranted as courts and social
agencies have consistently imposed cultural stereotypes to cre-
ate an image of a battered woman as a victim without agency.""
o Id. at 1428-29.
.. I&L at 1429.
112 id
"1 Mahoney, supra note 106, at 61 (describing feminists' concerns regarding the
use of victimization to perpetuate stereotypes about women's helplessness versus calls
from the right to stop talking about women as victims because it sounds like "whin-
ing").
114 Id. at 62.
115 Id.
6 Elizabeth Schneider, Feminism and the False Dichotomy of Victimization and Agency,
38 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 387 (1993). Schneider recounts that although recognition of
women's experiences as victims is necessary, an exclusive focus on victimization ig-
nores their real efforts to protect themselves and their children. Id. at 389. Similarly,
an exclusive focus on agency-which is shaped by liberal notions of autonomy and
mobility-is overly simplistic. Id. A singular approach to each fails to account for the
struggle and resistance women experience in their daily lives. Id See also Elizabeth
Schneider, Describing and Changing- Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert
Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L REP. 195 (1986) (cautioning against the use
of agency vs. victim language, pointing out the tension between the two and the diffi-
culty juries might have in reconciling a woman's supposed lack of agency with the use
of violent acts in self defense) [hereinafter Schneider, Describing and Changing].
17 See Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 116, at 221.
11. See Schneider, Resistance, supra note 91, at 500; Schneider, Particularity and Gen-
erality, supra note 101, at 548-50; Mahoney, supra note 83, at 52.
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Mothers who are battered face the same victim/agent di-
chotomy. However, in their case, the victim analogy is of no
benefit. The battered mothers can never achieve a higher vic-
tim status than the dead child. Unlike the battered woman who
kills her violent intimate partner, the mother charged with al-
lowing her child to be killed will not invoke sympathy from soci-
ety for her own victim status. We expect her to transcend her
victimization and to act on behalf of her children regardless of
her own situation.19 When the mother is evaluated as an inde-
pendent agent, her actions are harshly judged. The courts will
assume the mother could have protected her child simply by
separating the child from the abuser or by seeking assistance. 20
The law treats women as autonomous actors unaffected by the
interaction of power and control, domination and subordina-
tion, in the battering relationship,21 and therefore views them as
completely capable of saving their children. Such a view ignores
the complexity of mothers who are both victims and agents.'2 It
presents us with difficult cases from both a moral and legal per-
spective.'2 However, the difficulty of the undertaking does not
excuse our unwillingness to grapple with finding a more coher-
ent and fundamentally fairer way to evaluate these cases.
" Schneider, Resistance, supra note 91, at 552.
2 SeeV. Pulani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws'Failure to Protect Battered
Women and Abused Children, 19 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 229, 240-58 (1996). Enos identi-
fies three assumptions courts make when evaluating the behavior of women whose
children have been injured: (1) courts equate knowledge of abuse with ability to stop
abusive behavior or protect the child in some way; (2) the battered women's fear is
unjustified, unbelievable and exaggerated; and (3) parents should be treated as a
unit. Id. at 240, 258, 260.
Enos further identifies five myths associated with the assumptions: (1) the mother
could protect the child by taking the child away from abuser, removing abuser from
home or separating child from abuser by other means; (2) if mother wanted or
needed help, such assistance would be readily available from police, social services or
judicial system; (3) family, friends, neighbors and religious institutions would have
supported and assisted the mother, if only she truly desired to protect her children;
(4) battered women should risk their lives in an attempt to protect their children;
and (5) a mother who fails to protect her child from harm is responsible for that
harm regardless of her efforts to stop it. Id. at 240, 249, 253, 255-56. Though the ex-
amples Enos examines occur mostly in termination of parental rights cases, the as-
sumptions and myths are equally applicable in homicide cases.
'2' Mahoney, supra note 83, at 54. The law pretends women have autonomy and
that they are able to leave without taking into consideration the needs of others con-
nected to them, such as the needs of their children. See id. at 19, 64.
'2 See Schneider, Resistance, supra note 91, at 499.
2 Id.
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The complex societal views discussed above regarding
mothers and child abuse provide the context to analyze the re-
actions of the public as well as the legal actors to Pauline Zile's
case.
C. BAT=ERED MOTHERS AND THE LAW
Society's view of mothers is compounded by our inability to
fit the dynamics of the battered woman's life experience within
a contextual legal framework. Though scientific understanding
of the causes and effects of violence within the home continues
to grow, on a practical level a struggle to determine the value of
battered women continues. 124 Legally, we are mired in a vision
of the battered woman as the creature of "learned helplessness"
who, because of repeated cycles of violence is unable to act to
escape her violent home life.125 Rigid legal concepts and images
124 See id. at 480 (referring to society's views of resistance as opposed to ambivalence
and that resistance implicates issue of gender equality); see also Mary Ann Dutton, Un-
derstanding Women's Responses To Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syn-
drome, 21 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1191, 1213 (1993). Dutton describes studies, including
one where hospital emergency room physicians, before sensitivity training, recog-
nized only 5% of domestic violence cases. Dutton reports that only 10% of domestic
violence incidents result in calls to the police. Id.
Lawyers, including those who serve as defense counsel, are not immune from the
inability to recognize their clients as victims of domestic violence. In Florida, a lawyer
assigned to represent a woman who was pre-screened and qualified for filing a clem-
ency petition questioned the woman's statement that she was a frequent victim of
marital rape. The lawyer explained that the husband was only having sex with her
"before she was ready." Interview withJenny Greenberg, Executive Director, Battered
Women's Clemency Project, in Tallahassee, Fl. (May 1996).
' See Mary Ann Dutton, Validity of "Battered Woman Syndrome" in Criminal Cases In-
volving Battered Women, in NATIONAL INST. OF JUST. RESEARCH REPORT. THE VALIDITY
AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING BA=-RING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 18-
19 (1996) (indicating that empirical evidence can contradict the theory of "learned
helplessness;" not all women experience "cycles of violence;" and not all women ex-
perience the post traumatic stress types of reactions to battering); see also Schneider,
Describing and Changing supra note 116, at 195. As a result, women whose personal
strengths are apparent do not appear to the courts and jurors to fit the syndrome im-
age, despite the fact these women have been battered. The image of the passive
woman conflicts with the image of a woman capable of attempting to defend herself
physically.
Conflicting imagery can prevent a battered woman from effectively presenting an
affirmative case of self-defense-a traditional justification for killing another. In con-
sidering the assessment of criminal liability, an actor may not be held liable if her be-
havior was justifiable or excusable. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMNAL LAW
176-77 (1987). In both justifiable and excusable conduct crimes, the actor admits
that she committed the actus reus of the crime. Id. The issue becomes whether or not
the trier of fact attaches social utility to her actions. id. Philosophically, if her actions
are justifiable, it is because society views her behavior as acceptable, perhaps even de-
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of battered women prevent legal professionals from recognizing
other significant but less severe reactions. In the battered
mother's case, she may try to become a buffer, placing herself
between the children and the abuser, or she may engage in
other coping mechanisms, such as cutting back on her working
hours so that she can be home more frequently. The myriad al-
ternative responses have not been understood or thoroughly
evaluated to determine whether they meet a reasonableness test.
Judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys are all dissatisfied
with the exclusive use of battered woman syndrome to explain
the lives of battered women. 6 While the theories are being fine
tuned, the legal fate of mothers and all women trapped in vio-
lent relationships rests on shaky ground and the safety of their
children cannot be guaranteed.' 2
sirable. Id. If her actions are excusable, it is because her behavior has been viewed
not as desirable, but understandable under the circumstances. Justifiable actions
mandate an acquittal. Actions that are excusable may bring an acquittal, or under
certain circumstances may mitigate liability.
As a result of the critique and ongoing development of our knowledge about bat-
tering, most courts now recognize that the history of abuse in a relationship may be
relevant to an analysis of whether the woman was justified in using deadly force in an
interaction with an intimate. How the evidence comes in and what it is intended to
prove varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. An individual state's evidentiary rules
on expert testimony combined with standards defining reasonableness and defini-
tions of imminence define the parameters for the admission of evidence of battering.
SeeJanet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and its Effects in Criminal
Cases, in NATIONAL INSr. OF JusT.: THE VAUDrTy AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING
BATTERING AND ITs EFFEmrs IN CRIMINAL TAIS (1996); Holly Maguigan, Battered
Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 379 (1991). The Supreme Court of North Carolina, for example, held that as
a matter of law imminence cannot be established if the deceased was asleep at the
time of the killing. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989). Imminence implies
that, unless combated, the force will occur immediately. DRESSLER, supra, at 198. See
infra Part II (discussing the parallel development of the law protecting children and
noting the absence of consideration of the dynamics of the battery within the home).
" See Dutton, supra note 125. Prosecutors want a better way to explain to juries
why the battered woman witness did not leave, did not call the police, or why she re-
turned to the relationship. Id. at 3. Defense lawyers want to be able to introduce ex-
pert testimony in cases that do not fit the "learned helplessness" format of BWS. Id. at
2.
'2 Recent studies show that in households where there was violence against a fe-
male adult, that violence was more likely to occur in households with children. See
John Fantuzzo et al., Domestic Vwlence and Children: Prevalence and Risk in Five Major
U.S. Cities, 36 J. AM. ACAD. CHm ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 116 (1997). The authors
found that the domestic violence groups had a significantly higher proportion of
households with children and that the violence within these households evidenced a
greater proportion of risk factors to the children. Id. at 118.
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II. DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION OF FAILURE TO PROTECT LAWS
Pauline Zile chose her husband over her daughter and did nothing as her first-born
died suffering a final beating. She did not lift as much as a finger to protect Chris-
tina. 
2 8
Regrets: Not knowing he was being so rough when I wasn't there .... Not being able
to confront John.... Not being able to walk out the door and call the cops that
night ."
A. HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE LAW'S PROTECTION OF CHILDREN
The underlying basis for the development of failure to pro-
tect laws is the expression of the state's concern for the welfare
of its children.'m The family occupies a unique position in
American legal jurisprudence. Our courts recognize that the
family's autonomy and freedom from state interference are cru-
cial to its own integrity and the welfare of the nation.'3 Consti-
tutional law affords parents wide latitude in deciding how to
raise children. 32 Courts have consistently held that the primary
responsibility for child care rests with the parents themselves
and, with the exception of abuse or severe neglect, courts have
been unwilling to scrutinize any particular style of parenting.'33
The American legal system inherited this concern and respect
for the privacy of the parent-child relationship from its common
law roots. Under common law it was believed that parental
authority over children was a natural right which existed prior
to the rights of the state.'-" The right to have authority and con-
"2' Smith, supra note 3, at 4 (opening Statement of State Attorney Scott Cupp).
2' Athans, supra note 6, at IA. Pauline's co-workers commented that she worked
two and three jobs when John was unemployed. When they were without a car
Pauline would walk four miles to buy groceries and diapers. She was eight-and-one-
half months pregnant when Christina was killed. Id.
'" S. Randall Humm, CriminalizingPoor Parenting Skills as a Means to Contain Violence
By and Against Children, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1127 (1991).
"31 id
32 Id. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to select the
schooling of children under one's control); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(right to determine language taught to one's children).
" See Humm, supra note 130, at 1128; see also Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Differ-
ence, and Myster: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 37-39 (1994)
(arguing that the law characterizes the parent's right to punish as being within the
scope of the parent's constitutionally protected right to direct the custody, care and
control of their children).
"'4 See Odeana R. Neal, Myths and Moms: Images of Women and Termination of Parental
Rights, 5 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 62 (1995).
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trol over the children gave parents the obligation to care for
their children.'s
Legal concern with the welfare of children was and still is
episodic.'s The common law theory of parent-child relation-
ships did not always inure to the benefit of the child. Children
were exposed to many cruel practices without legal interven-
tion. 7 However, there were times when the state did intervene
on behalf of a child. Such intervention was made under the
authority of parens patriae.ls'
The modem American juvenile court system grew out of the
development and expansion of the notion of parens patiae.'
Juvenile courts were established to handle the needs of ne-
glected and abused children as well as to exert control over
children who were disobedient and engaged in criminal activ-
ity."' The establishment of the juvenile courts was fueled by an
era of social reform. 4' Ironically, many of those advocating for
the development of the system were women who considered
themselves leaders in the fight for women's rights.' The
agenda for many of these women was to save children from the
ills of poor parenting. They were commonly referred to as the
"child savers."
1"5 See id.
'56 See Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 63, at 1446 (highlighting the hy-
pocrisy of the state's concern for the fetus at the same time that it turns a blind eye
towards the health needs of living black children).
'" See Neal, supra note 134, at 63 (citing infanticide, abandonment, exposure, mu-
tilation, physical and mental cruelty as examples of the perils to which children were
exposed).
18 MEDA CHEsNEy-LiND & RANDAL. G. SHELDEN, Gnus, DNQ U ECY, ANDJVENIL
JuSTIcE 102 (1992). The principle of parens patriae was initially used to authorize the
king to administer the estates of orphaned children or children whose parents had
been declared unfit. Id. The doctrine evolved however into the ability of the state to
assume wardship over a minor child. Parens patriae allowed the state to "bind out"
children of poor or unfit parents for service in the colonies. Id. The concept of par-
ens patriae was deeply rooted in the principles of patriarchy which established the fa-
ther as having authority over both women and children. Id. at 103.





" Id. at 107-08. These were primarily white middle-class to upper-class women.
The campaign to protect children was viewed as an arena where the new political
voices could be heard and where their energies would be used and accepted. Id. at
107.
1 Id. at 106. The "child saver" movement occurred against the backdrop of an in-
flux of immigrants into the United States. These immigrants were largely the working
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From the beginning, the juvenile justice system intervened
in the lives of destitute women to regulate and monitor their
behavior. 144 Immigrant and poor mothers were seen as deviants,
and the legal and social welfare apparatus developed to regulate
these "bad" mothers by "saving" their children.'4 Poverty and
ethnicity often determined which families would be charged
with neglect and abuse.'4 Fathers were largely absent in these
environs, as the responsibility for raising children was thought
to properly rest on the shoulders of the mothers. Thus, the
very creation of the juvenile justice system institutionalized the
notions that mothers are primarily responsible for the care of
the children, and that mothers primarily would be held legally
responsible when care was wanting. The normative standard in-
cluded the assumption that the mothering skills of women of
color and poor women would be deficient enough to warrant
regular state intervention. On the other hand, the state re-
mained reluctant to extend its "protection" to those children in
class and poor of Europe who fled to American shores to find better economic op-
portunities. Id at 103. Unlike the women of the child saver movements, many of the
immigrant mothers were required to work to help feed and clothe their families.
Moreover, many of them were Catholic, as opposed to Protestant-the religion of
many of the child savers. Id at 105.
'44Dohrn, supra note 86, at 6.
I . Despite carrying the name the "child savers," many of the actions taken by
state officials on "behalf" of these children could hardly be termed beneficial. Chil-
dren were incarcerated for indeterminate periods of time and until 1967 they were
required to serve longer sentences than an adult would serve for a comparable of-
fense. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Courts routinely denied extending con-
stitutional protection to children. See, e.g., Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839)
(holding that the Bill of Rights did not extend to juveniles). The state could, "in the
best interest of the child," commit him to a work house or other detention facility for
training and correction, even no if criminal offense had occurred. This was particu-
larly true for female juveniles. See CHESNEY-LIND & SHELDON, supra note 138, at 110-
12. Child savers were particularly interested in protecting the sexual mores of female
children. As a result, females were subjected to intrusive interference which would
under other circumstances shock the conscience. For example, girls as young as nine
were forced to submit to full gynecological exams if they were caught running away
from home. Id. at 108. The ruling in In re Gault still only provided some constitu-
tional protection and only in the context of a criminal proceeding. The right to trial
by jury is an example of a constitutional right which is still not afforded tojuveniles in
a criminal case. SeeMcKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
"" See Dorhn, supra note 86, at 5-6; see also HANDLER, supra note 64, at 23 (discuss-
ing the prejudices against immigrant women, poor women, poor working women,
single mothers and women of color; all were seen as undeserving, unfitting for moth-
erhood or deviant in some other way).





homes which appeared to fit the more traditional concept of
stable home: two parent households with father as titular and
economic head, non immigrant and middle class. For children
in those households, courts deferred to the sanctity and privacy
of the household.
4 9
B. CURRENT THEORY ON FAILURE TO PROTECT
The attitudes that prevailed historically are still very much a
part of the current systems that evaluate whether a child is being
abused or neglected within a home. Current failure to protect
laws are the most recent reincarnation of the child saving phe-
nomenon. Beginning in 1974, Congress committed its time and
resources to the issue of child protection. 5 Over the next sev-
eral years legislation was enacted to provide additional funds
toward the effort to reduce child abuse. 5 ' Despite the addition
of Congressional funds, the incidence of child abuse and ne-
glect in this country continued to increase.' The apparent in-
crease led individual states to strengthen their laws regarding
abuse and neglect of children. In an effort to extend maximum
protection to children, many legislatures decided that parents
and others could be subject to abuse or neglect petitions or civil
actions when injury to the child was unintentional.55
"9 See Anne T. Johnson, Criminal Liability for Parents Who Fail To Protect Their Chil-
dren, 5 LAW & INEQ. 359, 362 (1987) (indicating the historical tension between defer-
ring to the family unit as having broad authority over the minor children and the
state's responsibility to insure the valid rights of the children).
o Id. at 363. In 1974, Congress adopted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treat-
ment Act, P.L. 93-247 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-06 (1994)). The Act established
a National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect and provided state grants to develop
child abuse prevention programs. Id.
'3' Id
1 Id. at 364. It is unclear whether actual incidents of abuse increased or whether
reporting of incidents increased. Historically, there have been published cases of se-
vere abuse of children. However, earlier in American history there were no agencies
to handle such incidents. Id. at 362. For example, in 1874, the Society for the Pre-
vention of Cruelty to Animals was petitioned to take up the case of an abused child.
Id. The 1984 amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention Act required that states
must have a law which provided for reporting and investigating known and suspected
cases of abuse. Id. at 364. These laws imposed a duty of reporting on professionals
working with children and exposed them to criminal liability for failure to report. Id.
"s State task forces were established to investigate the problem of child abuse and
to propose legislative initiatives. As a result, public and professional awareness of
child abuse increased. In 1993, approximately 2.81 million children were abused or
neglected in the United States. See Study: Child Abuse Has Doubled, NEVsDAY, Sept. 19,
1996, at A18 (citing report released at the National Conference on Child Abuse and
Neglect which indicates that reported cases of abuse doubled between 1986 and
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The push towards developing legislation and safeguards for
abused children paralleled the development of greater protec-
tion for abused and battered women from their batterers. The
process of educating the public and the judicial system to the
prevalence of violence within intimate space was and continues
to be a slow and painful one. Spearheaded by the activities of
grass roots women's organizations beginning in the 1970s, law-
makers and the courts were forced to recognize that violence
against women exists in our society and should not be toler-
ated.154  Massive public, legal and judicial information cam-
paigns have been and continue to be conducted around the
issue of women abuse. As a result, it would be mind boggling
for a judge to take the position that a man (husband) would
have the right to beat a wife to "keep her in place."56 Calls for
increases in resources are made and victims and their support-
ers have become the "cause celebre" of the moment.5 7 While
1993). But see Getting to Know America One State At a Time, NEWSDAY, Dec. 8, 1996, at A8
(indicating that 1,011,628 cases were confirmed abuse reports in 1994).
14 For a history of the grass roots movement and the development of shelters for
battered women, see Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence of Privacy Violence, in THE
PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 36, 38-42 (Martha Albertson Fineman &
Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994). Yet, it is not clear that we have recognized the true
pervasiveness of violence against women in the home. Id. The notion that violence is
or can be so pervasive still shakes the foundation of our assumptions about family and
the ability of any woman to be safe in the home. Id. at 42.
155 Id. at 41-42.
It was long ago that courts supported Blackstone's position on marital control:
"The husband is authorized to control his wife's behavior through the use of physical
force because he is responsible for her 'misbehavior' just as a man is allowed to cor-
rect his apprentices or children." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *444. How-
ever, it is still possible to find remarks made byjudges indicating their low opinions of
the seriousness of domestic violence. See, e.g., Deirdre M. Childress, Maryland Judge
Cleared of Bias in Remarks at Sentencing, WASH. POST, May 4, 1996, at B3; Elaine Tassy,
Cahill Says Remarks at Killer's Sentencing Not Meant to Offend, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 22,
1996, at 2B. The judge remarked during the sentencing of a man convicted of man-
slaughter for killing his unfaithful wife, "I seriously wonder how many men married
five years or four years would have the strength to walk away, but without inflicting
some corporal punishment." Tassy, supra, at 2B. He also referred to the defendant as
a "non-criminal." Id. The defendant was sentenced to 18 months, well below the
three to five years the sentencing guidelines allow.
"17 Witness the increase in visibility of the fight against domestic violence engen-
dered as a result of the killing of Nicole Brown Simpson. See State Laws on Abuse of
Spouses Reworked, OREGoNAN, June 23, 1994, at C12 (describing efforts of many states
to rework their domestic violence laws in the wake of the Nicole Brown Simpson and
Ronald Goldman murders); Maria L. LaGanga & Elizabeth Mehren, Simpson Case
Compels Nation to Look at Domestic Violence, L.A. TIMES, June 20, 1994, at 1. The exam-
ple is itself an example of how ambivalent society may really be on this issue. It took a
case of this profile to get the public's full attention-attention rivaled only in intensity
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the occurrence of violence against women in the home is still
difficult to understand, there is some movement towards recog-
nizing that a woman involved in a battering relationship cannot
always exercise choices that we assume would be "normal" and
rational. In fact exercising those choices may actually endanger
her.158
Despite the growing evidence and awareness regarding the
relationship between violence against women and abuse or ne-
glect of children within the family, few courts or agencies have
effectively used this awareness to the benefit of either the chil-
dren or their abused mothers.'59 The more we learn about fam-
ily violence, the more victims are re-victimized.6' Mandatory
reporting laws for health care providers, which were enacted to
help protect women and children, may end up putting both in
jeopardy. Too often the courts rely on poorly educated and ill
informed personnel to make a determination about the welfare
of the child.16 ' The paradox for battered mothers is such that if
with that generated after the airing of The Burning Bed, the Francis Hughes story. See
Karen Burstein, Naming the Violence: Destroying the Myth, 58 ALB. L REV. 951, 965-66
(1995). Yet, funding for safe shelters for women is inadequate. See, e.g., Gretchen P.
Mullins, The Battered Woman and Homelesness, 3J.L. & PoLY' 237, 249-50 (1994); see also
Mahoney, supra note 83, at 2. Thus, though we have a greater public awareness, it is
not as clear that we have a concrete commitment to the eradication of violence within
the home.
" Mahoney, supra note 83, at 61-65.
"9 See, e.g., Fantuzzo et al., supra note 127, at 117 (showing that children are dis-
proportionately present in households where there was a substantiated incident of
adult female assault and young children were disproportionately represented among
witnessing children); Susan M. Ross, Risk of Physical Abuse to Children of Spouse Abusing
Parents, 20 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECr 589-98 (1996) (the relationship between marital
violence and child abuse is three times greater for husbands than for wives; even
women who are the most chronically violent have only a 38% probability of physically
abusing a male child, whereas the most chronically violent husbands are almost cer-
tain to physically abuse their children); see also White Ribbon Campaign Support Effort to
Stop Domestic Violence PosT-STANDARD, June 6, 1997, at All (estimating that child
abuse may be present in 30-40% of homes where spouse abuse is also occurring).
" Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against Mothers Equals Violence Against Children: Under-
standing the Connection, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1995) (mothers face: (1) loss of
custody of children to the batterer, (2) initiation of neglect proceedings against
them; and (3) risk of prosecution for violating statutory duty to report known inci-
dents of child abuse).
"' Id. at 1114-15. See alsoJean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in
Client-Directed Lawyering For Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
1505, 1536-37 (1996) (observing the irony that the people closest to understanding
the needs of the children are farthest from the decision making process).
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she reports domestic violence in her home, her children may be
removed.'62
Most jurisdictions have now codified a "failure to protect"
standard in their child protective statutes.s Actions can be
taken against mothers in either the abuse or neglect context."
A civil finding of abuse or neglect does not mandate a corre-
sponding criminal inquiry.6a In civil proceedings mothers can
be held liable for "allowing" physical or sexual abuse, or "allow-
ing" an environment where such abuse could take place.r't The
distinction between abuse and neglect is based on the degree of
harm to the child.' 67 Neglect findings are made when the par-
ent fails to exercise a minimum degree of care and that failure
results in physical, emotional or psychological impairment to
the child.t "Minimum degree of care" is a purposely low
threshold of responsibility.'6 In setting the low level threshold,
little judicial or legislative attention was paid to the ways in
which institutional inaction created or increased the hazards
and hardships for the mothers of abused or neglected children
and minimized a woman's attempts to take action or to get
"'Rabin, supra note 160, at 1111-12.
' See Kristian Miccio, In the Name of the Mothers and Children: Deconstructing the Myth
of the Passive Battered Mother and the "Protected Child" in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 ALB.
L. REv. 1087, 1088 (1995).
' In New York, for example, parents may be held liable for abuse or neglect, de-
pending on the degree of harm to the child. Specifically the New York Family Courts
Act defines abuse as "causing or creating a substantial risk of death or serious or pro-
tracted disfigurement." N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr. § 1012(e) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1995).
Section 1012(f) defines neglect as "a failure to exercise a minimum of care, resulting
in the child's physical, mental, or emotional impairment or imminent danger of im-
pairment." Id. § 1012(f). See also Miccio, supra note 163, at 1090 n.13.
" Consequences include removal of the child from the home, termination of pa-
rental rights, destruction of the family unit, as well as social consequences that flow
from the stigma of being found to be "unfit" to raise children. See Rabin, supra note
160, at 1112.
'6 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr § 1012(e) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1995).
" Miccio, supra note 163, at 1089-90.
'6 Id. at 1089.
161 Id. at 1089-90. The object of the civil statute was to provide a safety net for as
many children as possible regardless of the effects on the parents. Id. The repercus-
sions to a parent in a civil matter with a low threshold do not carry sanctions as severe
as criminal sanctions such as the loss of liberty and commensurate social recrimina-
tion. However, in this instance, the low threshold could still be viewed as problematic
since it eases the intrusion into one of the most cherished and closely guarded rights
we have-family autonomy. See discussion of treatment of rights of family supra notes
12948 and accompanying text.
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help.'70 The low threshold approach has moved so far that some
states have established strict liability for neglect cases.17, A show-
ing that the child suffered harm would therefore be sufficient to
enter a finding of neglect or abuse against one or both parents.
The ease with which findings of neglect or abuse may be made
creates a public perception that effective steps are being taken
to protect children, despite the reality that both children and
their mothers may be victimized in the process.
C. CRIMINAL IABILIY
Without failure to protect legislation, a state could choose
to prosecute a non-abusing mother for murder, involuntary
manslaughter or aggravated child abuse. The mother could be
charged as an aider or abettor under each category. Each of
these theories would require proof that the non-abusing mother
had the requisite mens rea, as well as all other elements com-
monly associated with the criminal offense. People v. Novy' pro-
vides an example of the type of prosecution mothers face under
a traditional common law crime analysis. Kimberly Novy was
charged with first degree murder, aggravated battery to a child,
and cruelty to a child as a result of the death of her stepson.173
The child died from massive internal injuries and swelling of
the brain.74 The state prosecuted Novy on the theory that ei-
ther she or the child's father was responsible for his injuries.'7
If Novy had not inflicted the injuries herself, then she was con-
sidered accountable for the actions of Keith Novy, the boy's fa-
'70 Miccio, supra note 163, at 1090-92, uses the case of Cynthia D. as an illustration.
Despite Cynthia's repeated attempts to keep her abusive husband out of the home via
restraining orders (which he repeatedly violated), Cynthia lost custody of her child.
Id at 1091-92. In effect, Child Protective Services and the courts held Cynthia liable
for her failure to stop her own abuse and keep her husband out of the home. I&
The fact that Cynthia was stymied by the failure of the police to arrest her husband
when he violated a restraining order was not deemed relevant. Id. at 1092. When
Cynthia's husband came to visit their child, during a period of unsupervised visita-
tion, as ordered by the court, and beat her in front of the child, Cynthia was charged
with neglect since she could not prevent her husband from beating her. I& at 1091.
' I& at 1092-93 (synopsizing a New York case where the court finally recognized
that the lower courts had been applying a strict liability standard in neglect cases
without expressly stating); see also State v. Lucero, 647 P.2d 406 (N.M. 1982) (finding
New Mexico's strict liability child abuse statute constitutional).
'72 597 N.E.2d 273 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
'" Id. at 275.
174 rd.
"s Id. at 294-95.
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ther. 76 The court used twenty pages of a twenty-three page de-
cision to recount the conflicting facts of the case. In its final
pages, it upheld Novy's conviction of first degree murder and
found that if she did not inflict the injuries, she knew Keith
Nov inflicted the injuries.177 The court found it significant that:
(1) she remained with the father after the point when she
should have been aware of the foreseeability of injury; (2) she
failed to inform the authorities of the injuries; and (3) she ac-
tively concealed some of the injuries.ss Novy's case is significant
because under the theory of accountability, she became the first
woman to be convicted of first degree murder where a failure to
protect analysis formed part of the basis for her conviction. De-
spite the fact that Novy presented evidence that the child's
abuse and neglect began at least nine months before she even
met Keith Novy,17 she was nonetheless convicted. Keith Novy
was not prosecuted. 80
Many states that have used traditional common law crimes
as the basis for prosecution of non-abusing mothers have also
adopted statutes which imposed criminal sanctions for people
convicted of abusing children.'81 The criminal abuse statutes are
176 Im
'77 Id at 295-98.
178 Id. at 296. Ironically, if Kimberly left the marriage, there would have been no
additional guarantee of safety for the child, who would have remained with the fa-
ther, but Kimberly would not have been liable.
'7' Kimberly Novy did not begin to live with Keith until March 18, 1989. Id. at 278.
However, in 1987 doctors had already noted that both of Keith's children (as well as
the father himself) had poor personal hygiene. While Keith was still with the chil-
dren's birth mother, doctors noted the youngest child failed to thrive after an opera-
tion. In 1988, social services workers found that the child was withdrawn, had
noticeable tremors, little language skills, and was missing school. Id. at 279.
" Id. The state presented evidence that the victim had excessive absenteeism,
failed to thrive and was often dirty and smelled of urine during the year previous to
Kimberly meeting Keith. Id In addition, witnesses testified they saw Keith actively
engage in emotional abuse of the child. Id. at 280-81. Kimberly stated she had both
spanked the child with a belt and slapped him. Id. at 286. Keith on the other hand,
had threatened to smash the child's head with a baseball bat and had banged two of
the children's heads together so hard that it made an audible noise. Id. at 296. On
Kimberly's behalf, her lawyer introduced evidence to establish that she had a de-
pendent personality and that Keith's abuse of her, combined with her personality,
made it impossible for her to prevent his abuse of the children. Id.
.. See, e.g., AIA. CODE § 26-15-3 (1992) (a person is guilty of child abuse "who shall
torture, willfully abuse, cruelly beat or otherwise willfully maltreat any child under the
age of 18 years.... ."); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-70 (Supp. 1996) ("Any person commits
the offense of cruelty to children in the first degree when such person maliciously
causes a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental pain.").
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divided into two categories: those that punish people who actu-
ally commit the abuse"8 2 and those that seek to punish people
who exposed the child to risk of danger, or neglected to per-
form a duty of care or protection.1ss Purportedly, statutes seek-
ing to criminalize passive conduct do so in order to protect
children's "best interests" by compelling parents to remove their
children from abusive environments. Some legislators and
courts have focused on the following factors: (1) the parents'
legal duty to protect the child; (2) the parents' actual or con-
structive notice of the foreseeability of abuse; (3) the child's ex-
posure to the abuses and (4) the parents' failure to prevent
such abuse.Iss Parents can avoid liability under these statutes by:
(a) reporting the abuse; (b) removing the child from the abu-
sive situation; or (c) ejecting the abuser from the child's
home.lss
Specific failure to protect legislation can relieve the state of
the burden of proving mens rea once parental responsibility for
the child has been established. The most frequently cited mod-
em case establishing parental responsibility for a non-abusing
parent is State v. Walden.16 The case involved a charge that the
mother aided and abetted her boyfriend's abuse of her children
by passively standing by and doing nothing to help them. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the trial court's jury
instruction on the issue of parental responsibility which stated,
"[a] parent has a duty to protect their [sic] children and cannot
stand passively by and refuse to do so when it is reasonably
within their [sic] power to protect their children."187 The trial
court also instructed the jury that it could find the mother guilty
of aiding and abetting if it found that she was "present with rea-
"'Johnson, supra note 149, at 365. These statutes are referred to as "commission"
statutes. Id
' Id See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 554(1) (C) (West Supp. 1997) (im-
posing criminal sanction on a person who "recklessly endangers the health, safety or
welfare of a child under 16 years of age by violating a duty of care or protection");
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 639:3 (1996) (imposing criminal sanction on a person who
purposely violates duty of care, protection or support). These are "omission" statutes.
SeeJohnson, supra note 149, at 365.
" 4 LindaJ. Panko, Legal Backlash: The Expanding Liability of Women Who Fail to Protect
Their Children from Their Male Partner's Abuse, 6 HAsrNcs WOMEN'S L.J. 67, 68 (1995).
" Id The choices available to the non-abusing parent rest on the myths referred
to by Enos, supra note 120, at 240.
'" 293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982).
'8See id at 784.
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sonable opportunity and duty to prevent the crime and fails to
take reasonable steps to do so. "ls The Supreme Court estab-
lished that to require a parent, as a matter of law, to take af-
firmative action to prevent harm to his or her child, or be held
criminally liable, imposed a reasonable duty upon the parent.'9
Interestingly enough, it is also the Walden case which recog-
nizes the limitation of parental duty to protect. The court
stated:
This is not to say that parents have the legal duty to place themselves in
danger of death or great bodily harm in coming to the aid of their chil-
dren. To require such, would require every parent to exhibit courage
and heroism which, although commendable in the extreme, cannot real-
istically be expected or required of all people. But parents do have the
duty to take every step reasonably possible under the circumstances of a
given situation to prevent harm to their children."
The court indicated that there may be a range of options a par-
ent may take, depending on the situation.19' Ultimately, how-
ever, the court believed the reasonableness of the parent's
behavior was a question for the jury after proper instructions
from the trial court.92
While Walden laid the groundwork for liability through a
failure to protect approach, it was State v. Williquett 93 which es-
tablished criminal liability for non-abusing parents on the
grounds that the parent failed to protect the child. In Wil-
liquette, the State of Wisconsin prosecuted Terri Williquette on
two counts of child abuseY9 Unlike the charges in Walden, the
charges of abuse in Williquette were based on Williquette's al-
leged failure to take any action to prevent her husband from
"sexually abusing, beating, and otherwise mistreating" her son
"M8I& (emphasis in original).
189 Id. at 786.
190 Id.
191 Id.
' Id. Aleen Walden was charged with assault with a deadly weapon, on the theory
that she stood by when her boyfriend, George Hoskins, struck her child with a metal
tip belt. Id. at 783. The other Walden children testified that Hoskins beat their
youngest sibling. Id. Aleen Walden testified that the boy's natural father beat him
and that she was struck several times by him when she tried to intervene. Id. Walden
was convicted and sentenced to 5-10 years imprisonment. Id. at 782.




and daughter. 95 Williquette was charged under the Wisconsin
child abuse statute which provided:
Abuse of children. Whoever tortures a child or subjects a child to cruel
maltreatment, including, but not limited, to severe bruising... or any in-
jury constituting great bodily harm under § 939.22(14) is guilty of a Class
E felony...."
Williquette moved to have the charges against her dismissed
because the language of the statute did not specifically mention
acts of omission, and because the state had not alleged that she
directly committed the abuse.197 The trial court concluded that
the statute, as written, only applied to intentional acts of a de-
fendant who directly abused the child.198 The court of appeals
reversed the trial court's order of dismissal.199 It agreed that the
statute was not intended to cover omissions. However, the ap-
pellate court held that Williquette could be tried as an aider and
abettor to her husband's abusive actions (even though the state
elected not to charge aiding and abetting) .20 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed.20 1 The court agreed that Williquette
could be charged as an aider or abettor, but also ruled that
omission conduct satisfied the statute. °2 Finding that the lan-
guage of the statute was unambiguous, the court held that the
language did not limit the application of the child abuse statute




Furthermore, the court moved beyond simply affirming Wil-
liquette's conviction. It established two additional parameters
for failure to protect cases, namely (1) that an objective stan-
dard would be employed to determine what acts constitute child
abuse,2°' and (2) that no mens rea need be demonstrated to es-
z9,9-d.
196 I (quoting Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.201). Section 940.201 was repealed and re-
placed by § 948.03 in 1989. SeeWls. STAT. ANN. § 948.03 (West 1996).
197 Wil/iquette 385 N.E.2d at 148.





2 "Thus child abuse consists of subjecting a child to conduct which is 'abhorrent
to the sensitivities of the general public.'" IM at 150. In the court's opinion, this
standard gave the mother reasonable notice of her affirmative duty to protect her
child from a foreseeable risk of cruel maltreatment.
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tablish the crime.0 The court cited two previous cases where it
held that the charge of child abuse does not require a criminal
intent in support.2l Perhaps because the exposure to criminal
liability was slight, in comparison to other felonies, the court
was not troubled with establishing strict liability or even a negli-
gence standard of liability.20 7 After the Williquette decision, the
Wisconsin legislature codified the court's ruling and formally
included failure to act in its reformulated child abuse statute.28
05 id
Id. (citing State v. Danforth, 385 N.W.2d 125 (Wis. 1986); State v. Killory, 243
N.W.2d 475 (Wis. 1976)). In Killory, "cruel maltreatment" was challenged on vague-
ness grounds. It was the first opportunity that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had
to interpret the statute. Killory was a college professor who tried to cure his niece of
"psychopathy" by subjecting her to beatings and forced enemas. Based on a diction-
ary definition of "cruel," the court decided the word did not require malicious intent.
Killory, 243 N.W.2d at 483. Danforth, also a case of active abuse, was decided on the
same day as Williquette. In Danforth, the court held that specific intent was not a re-
quired element of child abuse. 385 N.W.2d at 129.
207 When Killory was convicted, the penalty was a fine of $500 or imprisonment, not
to exceed one year. Killoy, 243 N.W.2d at 479; see also Nancy A. Tanck, Commendable
or Condemnable?: Criminal Liability For Parents Who Fail To Protect Their Children From
Abuse, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 659, 663 n.23. Williquette's financial exposure was greater.
she faced a fine of up to $10,000, but the total jail exposure was not to exceed two
years. Id. at 665 n.38. It was considered a Class E felony. Id. at 660 n.5. In criminal
law theory strict liability crimes are not viewed favorably because they contradict no-
tions of guilt based on individual liability determined through the evaluation of the
actus reus combined with the defendant's mens rea. The tension between strict liability
and criminal liability is demonstrated in the writings on felony murder. DRESSLER, su-
pra note 125, at 119. Many states sought to restrict or limit the grounds upon which
felony murder charges could be brought due to the inherent unfairness of convicting
someone of a crime they did not intend to convict. See infra notes 292-93.
The legislature adopted the following language:
Failing to act to prevent bodily harm
(a) A person responsible for the child's welfare is guilty of a Class C felony if that
person has knowledge that another person intends to cause, is causing or has in-
tentionally or recklessly caused great bodily harm to the child and is physically
and emotionally capable of taking action which will prevent the bodily harm
from occurring or being repeated, fails to take that action and the failure to act
exposes the child to an unreasonable risk of great bodily harm by the other per-
son or facilitates great bodily harm to the child that is caused by the other per-
son.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.03(4) (West 1997).
Whether Williquette was emotionally capable of providing assistance was not a fac-
tor in the court's decision of her case. Indeed, it was only thoroughly examined by
the court in a case brought seven years later when a man challenged his conviction as
an aider and abettor of his wife's abuse of his stepchildren. See State v. Rundle, 500
N.W.2d 916 (Wis. 1993). The State chose not to charge Rundle under § 948.03(4) (a)
but rather as an aider or abettor. I. at 917. His conviction was reversed because the
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The reformulated statute elevated the severity of the felony
ranking and required intentional or reckless conduct. The
holding in Williquette served as the model of omissions analysis
for other states when their own state statutes did not specifically
speak on the issue of failure to protect.
While the failure to protect laws are written in gender neu-
tral terms, their application and broad effect are gendered.
Women are overwhelmingly prosecuted under these statutes be-
cause they are deemed to have primary caretaking responsibili-
ties for the children and because they are within reach of the
law.2°° Men may not be within reach, either because of flight or
because no legal parental ties to the biological father have been
established.1 0 Most importantly, because men are increasingly
more likely to be the actual perpetuators of the violence,
women are left to prevent the violence.
The imposition of an affirmative duty to protect a child
from an abuser's violence creates a problem when the protect-
ing parent fears retaliation from the abuser. Protecting the
child in this situation can prove dangerous to the intervener
and to the child.2 12  Only three states-Iowa, Minnesota, and
Oklahoma-have expressly created an affirmative defense for a
parent who finds herself at risk of death or serious bodily injury
if she acts to protect the child. In order to exercise the de-
State did not prove that he intended his actions or inaction to aid the abusing
mother. IM at 925.
' See Nancy S. Erickson, Battered Mothers of Battered Children: Using Our Knowledge of
Battered Women to Defend Them Against Charges of Failure to Act in IA CUMMr
PERSPECTIVE ON PSYcHOLGICAL, LEGAL & ETHIcAL IssuEs 195, 197 (Sandra A. Garcia &
Robert Batey eds., 1990).
2'0 Id at 197-98. Heightened duty is based on the relationship of parent to child.
Until recently, many state statutes did not view the biological father as a legal parent
if he was not wed to the mother. Men who are not biologically related to the children
of their girlfriends also may have no duty to intervene.
" See supra discussion in Part I.
2 Johnson, supra note 149, at 367; see also Fantuzzo et al., supra note 127, at 120
(finding that a sizeable number of children in violent households are involved in
multiple ways in the incident of abuse, including precipitating the dispute that led to
the violence).
215 SeeJohnson, sup-a note 149, at 367 (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 726.6.1(e) (West
1986); MINN. STAT. § 609.378 (1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852.1A (West
1997)). The Minnesota Criminal Code defines endangerment of a child as follows:
Subdivision 1. (b) Endangerment. A parent, legal guardian, or caretaker who
endangers the child's person or health by.
(1) intentionally or recklessly causing or permitting a child to be placed in
a situation likely to substantially harm the child's physical, mental, or emotional
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fense, the defendant must have reasonably believed that to in-
terfere would result in additional injuries to the child or to the
defendant. The reality of the child's injury or death makes it
difficult to view the mother's situation from her perspective at
the time of the incident. Sympathies for the child's suffering
can obscure the fact-finder's ability to properly evaluate the
mother's choices.
Finally, it is difficult to locate many of the women who face
the quandary of being both battered and non-abusing mothers
in the criminal justice system. Because of the threat of life im-
prisonment, without the possibility of parole, or even the possi-
bility of having death imposed, many mothers plead to second
degree murder or involuntary manslaughter. Often we only be-
come aware of them if they are referred to in the appeals of
their spouses or significant others.214
health or cause the child's death;... is guilty of child endangerment and may be
sentenced to imprisonment for not more one year or to payment of a fine of not
more than $3,000, or both. If the endangerment results in substantial harm to
the child's physical, mental, or emotional health, the person may be sentenced
to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more
than $10,000, or both.
(2) Defenses. It is a defense to a prosecution under subdivision 1, para-
graph (a), clause (2), or paragraph (b), that at the time of the neglect or endan-
germent there was a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the defendant that
acting to stop or prevent the neglect or endangerment would result in substantial
bodily harm to the defendant or the child in retaliation.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.378 (West 1997). Minnesota does also recognize endanger-
ment as an underlying felony in felony murder charges where the child dies. Id. §
609.185.
The Iowa law reads:
A person who is the parent, guardian, or person having custody or control over a
child.., commits child endangerment when the person does any of the follow-
ing:... (e) knowingly permits the continuing physical or sexual abuse of a child
or minor. However, it is an affirmative defense to this subsection if the person
has a reasonable apprehension that any action to stop the continuing abuse
would result in substantial bodily harm to the person or the child or minor.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 726.6.1 (West 1997).
Finally, the Oklahoma statute provides:
A person who is the parent, guardian, or person having custody or control over a
child ... commits endangerment when the person knowingly permits physical or
sexual abuse of a child. However, it is an affirmative defense to this paragraph if
the person had a reasonable apprehension that any action to stop the abuse
would result in substantial bodily harm to the person or the child.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852.1. (West 1997).
214 See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 343 S.E.2d 122 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (defendant chal-
lenged the sufficiency of testimony which came partially from his wife who was also
charged and pled guilty as an accomplice); see also Schneider, Resistance, supra note
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III. THE THEORY OF OMmSIONS LIABILrrY
[The law places on a parent a legal duty to protect her child.... She can't put up
blinders and say,... "I don't see anything, I don't hear anything"...
215
I asked John ifI could go call 911. He said no, its [sic] too latea
'
M
Pauline Zile was initially charged with three counts of ag-
gravated child abuse and one count of first degree felony mur-
der.217 The underlying felony for the murder charge was
aggravated child abuse.18 The State alleged that Pauline Zile's
conduct in failing to protect her child rose to the same level of
91, at 516-17 (difficulty in finding women who have been subjected to battering be-
cause court records are poorly developed by counsel or alternatively, no record exists
because the women were improperly advised regarding plea options). There are sev-
eral women incarcerated in the Florida Correctional Institute in Lowell, Florida
whose children were killed by boyfriends. They are young, late teens or early twen-
ties, and pled to second degree murder to avoid exposure to the death penalty.
Telephone Interview with Midge Watson, Founder of the Women Helping Women
Program, Tallahassee, Fla. (Mar. 1997). "Women Helping Women" is a volunteer
program that teaches female inmates to recognize the signposts of domestic violence
and helps develop strategies to end violence.
2"' Closing statement of State Attorney Duggan in the trial, TR, supra note 9, at
2630.
216 Florida Dep't of Corrections Presentence Report 12 (No. 94-11068) (typed Apr.
28, 1995) [hereinafter Presentence Report] (on file with author) (citing Zile state-
ment to police).
217 The indictment for one of the aggravated child abuse counts alleged that
Pauline kept Christina out of school after her disappearance. The court dismissed
the count since Christina was already dead so it was impossible to abuse her at that
time. However, it is questionable whether this count could be valid even if the child
were alive given the definition of aggravated abuse. The other two counts of aggra-
vated child abuse related to two separate occasions when Pauline was observed to
striking Christina. Only one of those occasions referred to action taken on the actual
date of Christina's death.
2'a The Florida statute provides as follows:
"Aggravated child abuse" occurs when a person: (a) Commits aggravated battery
on a child; (b) Willfully tortures, maliciously punishes, or willfully and unlawfully
cages a child; or (c) Knowingly or willfully abuses a child and in so doing causes
great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the
child.
FL& STAT. ANN. § 827.03(2) (West 1998). "Torture" is then defined as "every act,
omission, or neglect whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused."
Id. § 827.01(3) (emphasis added).
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culpability as the conduct of John Zile who affirmatively caused
Christina to die. 19
A. WHY PUNISH OMISSIONS?
Though somewhat unusual in our system of jurisprudence,
there is a growing trend towards the establishment of crimes
that are committed through omission, or the failure to act when
action is expected.220 Traditionally, the law looks to affirmative
acts when assessing criminal liability. The common law drew a
distinction between affirmative acts and omissions. "Criminal-
"9 Florida's definition of first degree murder includes: "(1) (a) The unlawful killing
of a human being... (2) When committed by a person engaged in the perpetration
of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any-... (h) Aggravated child abuse." Id. § 782.04.
Murder in the first degree constitutes a capital felony, punishable by death or life im-
prisonment without possibility of parole. Id Murder in the second degree includes:
(2) The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated by an act immi-
nently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human
life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any par-
ticular individual . . ." I&. Second degree murder is "punishable by imprison-
ment for a term of years not exceeding life...
(3) When a person is killed in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpe-
trate ...
(h) Aggravated child abuse, by a person other than the person engaged in
the perpetration or in the attempt to perpetrate such felony, the person perpe-
trating or attempting to perpetrate such felony is guilty of murder in the second
degree...
(4) The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated without design to
effect death, by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to
perpetrate, any felony other than: ...
(h) Aggravated child abuse ... is murder in the third degree."
Id. See also Nicholson v. State, 600 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1992); Nicholson v. State, 579
So. 2d 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (disapproving holdings of Florida State Courts
of Appeals that the legislature, in § 827.03, only intended to punish specific acts of
commission).
'Lionel H. Frankel, Criminal Omissions: A Legal Microcosm, 11 WANE L. REV. 367,
384 (1965) (growth of vast body of conduct-regulating statutes). Omissions liability is
a derivative form of liability in that the actions of the party who falls to intervene is in-
sufficient in and of itself to constitute a violation of the norm under which he is being
punished. Liability requires an independent process for which the party will be held
accountable. See GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 583 (1978). Fletcher
identifies four elements that are presupposed in derivative liability: "(1) a harm that is
to be attributed to the actor, (2) an independent human or natural process that is the
primary cause of the harm, (3) the actor's ability to prevent the harm and his failure
to do so, (4) a duty to intervene and prevent the harm." Id. at 588. Additionally,
Fletcher identifies two problems with omissions analysis: weak causal relationship be-
tween the harm caused by the independent act and the failure to intervene, and the
conceptual difficulty of applying notions of "intent" to failures to act. Id. at 582-83.
For the battered mother, the independent process is the action of the active abuser.
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ity" was described as "the voluntary behavior, under relevant
surrounding circumstances, to which the law attributes actual or
threatened harm."21 Thus, "'[t]he reason for requiring an act,
is that an act implies a choice' and the criminal law operates by
influencing choice."2 Normally law is envisioned as proscribing
the infliction of particular harm.2 However, it is also well ac-
cepted in our system of criminal justice that criminality may also
attach where the actor has a legal duty to act and the capacity to
act but fails to do So.24 Legal scholars believe the exception to
the act requirement is permitted because the actor's failure to
perform a legal duty of which he is capable satisfies the purpose
of the of the act requirement, 225 that is, that the omission "re-
flects a purposeful focusing of choice upon the circumstances
surrounding [the actor's] behavior and the likely consequences
[of such behavior].226 In a common law analysis, in order "[f] or
criminal liability to be based upon a failure to act, it must first
be found that there is a duty to act-a legal duty and not simply
a moral duty."22 The categories of legal duty have been vari-
ously described as ranging from four to seven.2s The develop-
' Id. at 386.
Id. at 387 (quoting OLVERWENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 54-55 (1881)).
"Arthur Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CAL. L REv. 547,
548 (1988).
224 SeePAuLH. ROBINSON, CRImN.ALL4W 191 (1997).
n' Id. at 191-92; see also Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Liability For Omissions: A Brief
Summary and Critique of the Law in the United States, 29 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 101, 106
(1984).
22 Frankel, supra note 220, at 387; see also FLETCHER, supra note 220. Fletcher states
it as a sophisticated version of looking at isolated events apart from their effects on
other persons or their interests which he calls "atomistic." Id. at 590-91. This atomis-
tic view "reduces to the observation that some norms prohibit conduct and others re-
quire conduct." Id. at 591. Thus, "[o]missions are the violations of norms that
require conduct." Id.
'LAFAVE & Scor, supra note 38, at 203.
2' Frankel, supra note 220, at 369-70, cites to the duties established in Jones v.
United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962): (1) where a statute imposes a duty of
care; (2) where one stands in a status relationship to another;, (3) where one has as-
sumed a contractual duty to care for another;, and (4) where one has previously as-
sumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others
from rendering aid. In contrast, Hughes identifies five areas in which a legal duty can
be established: (1) by operation of law;, (2) by virtue of status relationship; (3) by vir-
tue of the exercise of a privilege; (4) by virtue of the decision to participate in a pub-
lic sphere; and (5) by virtue of contractual or gratuitous voluntary undertakings.
Graham Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L. J. 590, 599-600 (1958). Additionally,
see Robinson, supra note 225, at 101; LAFAvE & SCOT, supra note 38, at 203-07, not-
ing seven categories: (1) duty based upon relationship; (2) duty based upon statute;
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ment of the concept of "legal duty" was to establish limits be-
yond which it was deemed morally inappropriate or perhaps too
risky to impose liability for failure to act.' Traditionally,
authorities "agreed that the law neither could or should punish
all ... omissions."23 0 For example, there is no general duty to
rescue. 231 This refusal to adopt a general duty to rescue sets An-
glo-American law apart from European law on the issue of res-
232cue.
At common law, a person was held to have an affirmative
duty to assist another who stood within a certain legal relation-
ship. Therefore, it was the duty of parents to aid their chil-
dren,233 husbands to aid their wives,2s masters to aid their
servants,2- and ship captains to aid their passengers and crew.23
(3) duty based upon contract; (4) duty based upon voluntary assumption of care; (5)
duty based upon creation of peril; (6) duty of landowner; and (7) duty to control the
conduct of others/general duty to rescue.
" The tension between the desire to recognize the moral imperative to help those
in need of rescue weighed against the danger of casting the net of liability too expan-
sively was pointed out in early discussion among English jurists when attempting to
formulate a Code of Law for India. See Frankel, supra note 220, at 382-84. Fletcher
cautions that legal duty as used in this sense should be distinguished from liability for
breach of a specific statutory act such as failure to file a tax return. The cases of spe-
cific statutory duties to act generate direct liability where the offense is complete at
the moment of the breach. FLETCHER, supra note 220, at 585-86. "Derivative liability,
in contrast, is based on some independent process of events over which the defen-
dant has minimal control, and therefore liability is not subject to determination until
these events run their course." Id at 586. While it would be appropriate for the legis-
lature to create direct liability by specifying the situations in which there was a duty to
act, "[i]t would still be incumbent on the courts to work out these duties in specific
cases." Id. Legislative attempts to create omissions liability for parents who fail to
protect may blur the distinction between derivative and direct liability, causing confu-
sion as the courts attempt to interpret whether the mother's failure to act alone com-
pletes the violation. See infra Part IV. Fletcher also indicates that negligent
manslaughters are also sometimes framed as omissions, but that they, like specific
statutory duties, require a different analysis and do not satisfy the criteria for deriva-
tive liability. FLETCHER, supra note 220, at 586-88.
'" Leavens, supra note 223, at 553.
"' There are exceptions to the general rule. Both Minnesota and Vermont have
statutes imposing a duty to rescue all persons, not just those with special duties. See
MINN. STAT. § 604A.01 (West 1998); VT. STAT. tit. 12, § 519 (1997).
32 For analysis of French, Italian and German law on the duty to rescue the help-
less, see Frankel, supra note 220, at 371. See also Hughes, supra note 228, at 632-34,
for a discussion of how Yugoslav, French, German, Italian, and Soviet law treat the is-
sue of duty to rescue.
2n SeeJones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
SeeWestrup v. Commonwealth, 93 S.W. 646 (Ky. Ct. App. 1906).
See Queen v. Brown, [1893] 1 Terr. L.R. 475; Rex v. Smith, 172 Eng. Rep. 203,
205 (K.B. 1826).
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It is correct for the law to view the mother of a battered, abused
or murdered child as having an established legal duty to aid her
child. Indeed, the recognition of the parent's legal duty re-
mains as one of the earliest consistently recognized special rela-
tionships.237
Legal scholars who have written about omissions liability,
however, seem to accept without question that it is correct to
hold a mother liable in all situations where she fails to protect
the child from abuse or fails to rescue the child when abuse oc-
curs.m Even though the doctrine provides that a parent is not
required to risk death or serious bodily injury, no serious atten-
tion has been given to the development of principles limiting
parental liability.s9 Setting the issue of limitations aside for the
moment, the question of whether a duty to act exists does not
conclusively resolve the issue of criminal liability for failure to
act. A more sophisticated analysis is required. However, before
moving to analyze causal connections it is necessary to note that
the state may elect to charge a mother with complicity in the
2 11 Will. 3, ch.7 (1698-99 Eng.), cited in Hughes, supra note 228, at 594 n.18.
Hughes observed that in the early analysis of omissions liability, it appeared that the
common law granted a higher place to the interests of seamen than those of children,
and that early theorists never suggested liability for homicide through the neglect of
children. He traces the expanded parental liability for protection of children to the
mid 1850s as reflected in Regina v. Bulb, 4 Gox Cr. Gas. 455 (Oxford Cir. 1851). Id. at
621. See also Frankel, supra note 220, at 381 (describing the increased prosecutions of
pauperized parents for failing to care for their children).
' Se ag., Regina v. Downes, 1 Q.B.D. 25, 29-30 (1875). However, parental duty
was not the earliest special relationship developed. As of 1715, the major failures for
which a person could be prosecuted had to do with failures to assist the lord of the
manor. Little was mentioned about parental duty until the early 1800s. See Hughes,
supra note 228, at 590-97 (discussing the history of criminal omissions). Frankel
agrees that early law had neither the time nor the resources to consider issues of
criminal liability on the basis of failure to act, but was much more concerned with ac-
tual violent acts which threatened the lord's stability. Frankel, supra note 220, at 371-
76.
For example, in analyzing Palmer v. State, 164 A.2d 467 (Md. 1960) (manslaugh-
ter conviction of mother upheld when "paramour" killed child), Frankel states that
the court's conclusion seems "uncontestably sound." Frankel, supra note 220, at 398.
He claims that we are "shocked" by the failure of the mother in this case to show a
greater concern for the welfare of her infant daughter. Id. at 399 n.104. The mother
in Palmer is not guilty of manslaughter because she breached her statutory duty to
care for the child, but because she was deviant and delinquently failed to rescue the
child from her lover's brutality. The terms "deviant" and "delinquent" are just ways of
expressing shocking breaches of community expectation. Id.
"' See supra Part II discussion of development of "failure to protect" theory.
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death of her child.24° Accountability and aiding and abetting are
theories of complicity. Complicity, like omission, is a derivative
form of liability. 41 It is thus a particularly attractive way to estab-
lish liability against mothers. It requires the existence of an in-
dependent process with which the aider or abettor interacts.2 2
Typically, a person can be said to be an accomplice to someone
actively engaged in committing a crime if she "(a) gave assis-
tance or encouragement or failed to perform a legal duty to
prevent [the act] (b) with the intent thereby to promote or fa-
cilitate commission of the crime."243
If a duty is established, as with any other type of criminal of-
fense, we must be able to establish a nexus between the failure
of the actor to meet her duty and the actual injury suffered. In
other words, for our purposes, is there a nexus between the
mother's failure to act and the death of the child? The legal
duty analysis for establishing liability by omission has been cri-
tiqued for its failure to create a satisfactory nexus "between the
duty requirement and the causal nature of the criminal prohibi-
tion .... 244 The problem then is to distinguish between those
omissions that "cause" harm and those that do not.245
B. CAUSATION'S ROLE IN THE OMISSIONS ANALYSIS
Many scholars have explored questions of causation in
criminal law. Rarely does the analysis involve gendered consid-
erations, except in the context of rape and domestic violence. A
nongendered theoretical analysis can produce significant dan-
240 See People v. Stanciel, 606 N.E.2d 1201 (Ill. 1992) (mother convicted of first de-
gree murder on the basis of accountability when her boyfriend killed her child; ac-
countability is Illinois' version of aiding and abetting).
241 FLETcHER, supra note 220, § 8.5, at 634-35.
2 42 
id.
20 LAFAVE & ScoTt, supra note 38, § 6.7, at 576. See alsoJoshua Dressier, Reassessing
the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to Old Problems, 37
HASTINGS L.J. 91 (1985); Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the
Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323 (1985); Paul H. Robinson, Imputed
Criminal Liability, 93 YALE LJ. 609 (1984).
244 Leavens, supra note 223, at 562.
145 Id. Indeed, Frankel argues that the nexus is "all too clear;," establishing a causal
relationship is at most a preliminary problem. Frankel, supra note 220, at 388 (citing
Herbert Wechsler &Jerome Michaels, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L.
REv. 701, 723-24 (1937)). Attribution is really a matter of deciding how to fix blame
when faced with a sometimes vast number of causes. Id. (citing H.L. HART & TONY
HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 22 (1959)). Causal connections are also a factor in
aiding and abetting cases.
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gers to a battered mother faced with charges of failure to pro-
tect. Causation in Anglo-American law is traditionally broken
into a two prong analysis.246 First it must be determined that the
actor's behavior is the "but-for" cause of the result. We ask
whether the actor's conduct is the antecedent without which the
event would not have occurred. In order to proceed with an at-
tempt to impose criminal liability upon the actor, there must be
a determination that the "but-for" threshold has been met.
247
This threshold is also known as the "legal cause."248 In the sec-
ond prong of the causation analysis, it must be asked whether
the actor's failure to act was also the proximate cause of the
child's death.249 Here the law differentiates between or among
the many possible "but-for" causes, identifying some as the di-
'46 See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 38, § 3.12, at 277.
247 This is the sine qua non test, also known as "actual cause," "factual cause" or
"cause-in-fact." DRESSLER, supra note 125, § 14.02[A]. "The sine qua non test serves a
limited but very important purpose. It functions in a negative manner to exclude cer-
tain forces, including human ones, from responsibility for resultant harm." Id.
248 Consider the quintessential causation hypothetical: A, B, and C are able-bodied
adults standing beside a pool in which a young child is drowning. A, a stranger,
pushed the child into the pool. Each could easily save the child but none does and
the child drowns. A is clearly liable for homicide because A pushed the child in. Are
the others liable for the death of the child as well? They can only be liable if their
failure to rescue the child also caused the child's death. One could hardly dispute
the fact that had the observers, B and C, pulled the child out of the water, she would
not have drowned. It is possible to say therefore that B and C's failure to act was the
antecedent cause but-for which the child would not have drowned. See Leavens, supra
note 223, at 563. However, criminal liability would not normally be imposed upon B
and C: the hypothetical assumes B and C had no improper mens tea. Excusing B and
C from liability is consistent with the Anglo-American policy of liability limitation.
There is no logical reason, however, why B and C could not be held liable on some
level. In those jurisdictions which impose a duty to rescue, both B and C could
probably be charged with a misdemeanor.
2'9 Dressler notes that courts in discussing proximate cause use conclusory terms
such as "direct cause," "remote cause," and "superseding intervening cause."
DRESSLER, supra note 125, § 14.03[A], at 163. Dressier suggests that a court or ajury
does not in fact "discover" the proximate cause of harm; rather, the jury "selects" it.
Id. "The decision to attach causal responsibility for social harm to one rather than to
another actual cause is one made by common sense and moral intuitions." Id. Under
the Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute attempted to eliminate some of
the confusion surrounding the definition of proximate cause. Id. at § 14.04[B] (cit-
ing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 commentary at 256 (1985)). The MPC accepts the
common law sine qua non rule. IR § 14.04[A]. "The remaining issue... is whether [a
defendant] caused the prohibited result with the level of culpability-purpose,
knowledge, recklessness or negligence-that is required in the definition of the of-
fense." Id. at § 14.04[B] (discussing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 commentary at 260
(1985)).
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rect or proximate cause of the result.250 In criminal law, just as
in torts, the proximate cause determination is "not altogether or
even chiefly a question of mechanical connection or scientific
law but a mixed question turning largely on the policy of imput-
ing or denying liability."t '' "Since the attribution process is a
matter of fixing blame, it is concerned primarily with violated
mandates and prescriptions and the public expectations arising
from those mandates and prescriptions. Thus, "[t]he more
serious the violation, the greater will be the tribunal's willing-
ness to attribute blame even though the causal relationship is
far removed and unclear." s5
One approach to examining the proximate cause determi-
nation is to attempt to determine which act, of a possible uni-
verse of acts, can be used to analogize to a physical cause and
effect. In other words, can we identify the act that changes the
status quo?254 To a large degree, the concept of status quo re-
volves very much around the conception of what is normal so
that "status quo" can be determined. Presumably our everyday
"0 Leavens, supra note 223, at 564. Frankel echoes the discussion on the causation
issue. Frankel, supra note 220, at 388-89. He posits that the law is "concerned primar-
ily with violated mandates and proscriptions and the public expectations arising from
those mandates and proscriptions." Id (footnote omitted). He asserts that blame fix-
ing is only secondarily interested in conduct, "and conduct which does not violate
public expectations is neutral and irrelevant even though it was in fact a cause of the
harm." Id. at 389.
" Hughes attributes this notion to Jerome Hall. Hughes, supra note 228, at 627
(discussing JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRD41NAL LAW 256-66 (1947)). It
would follow then that if C were the child's parent, C might be assessed liability be-
cause the public expectation that the parent would act to prevent the drowning
would be greater for C, the parent, than for B, a stranger. This assumes that B has no
contractual or other duty to rescue the child, e.g., that B is not a lifeguard.
252 Frankel, supra note 220, at 388-89.
253 d. at 389. However, Frankel points out that:
violation of a public expectation alone, without factual causation, will [not] war-
rant attribution of harm to the violation. However, when the violated mandate
to act is forseeably related to the prevention of the very harm involved, the tribu-
nal may be expected to conclude that the violation was a cause, and the blame-
worthy cause, of the harm. Similarly, a harm may be attributed to an omission
when the omission was in breach of an expectation that the omitter would act to
prevent the harm.
Id. (citations omitted).
24 In the drowning hypothetical, A's push of the child into the pool has changed
the status quo and placed the previously safe child into a life threatening situation.
Common sense tells us that of all the events which occurred, including the child's
wandering into the pool area, it is A's push that is the impetus for the changed condi-
tions. Leavens, supra note 223, at 568.
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understanding of the status quo will encompass "more than the
physical state of affairs at a given time."M5 Status quo "is taken to
include expected patterns of conduct, including actions de-
signed to avert certain unwanted results." s Once it is realized
that the particular undesired state of affairs can be avoided by
taking certain precautions, those precautions are incorporated
into what is seen as "normal or at rest state of affairs."2 7 As Pro-
fessor Leavens explains:
A failure to engage in the preventive conduct in these cases can thus be
seen as an intervention that disturbs the status quo. When such failure
to act is a necessary condition (a "but for" cause) of a particular harm,
then that failure fairly can be said to cause that harm.m
The multiple interpretations of the best way to analyze cau-
sation have been ascribed to the tension between the law's dis-
tinction between affirmative acts and omissions. Some scholars
have alleged this distinction to be false.29 They suggest that the
omission should not be seen as an affirmative act because too
little of the omission actor's conduct has been analyzed.2, ° Al-
ternatively, it is proposed that the analysis of who can be held li-
able would be made easier if the causal analysis were extended
beyond the few moments before the incident which leads to
death or serious injury and focused instead on a broader
"course of conduct."26 ' For example, in Palmer v. State'2 2 the
court went beyond looking at the mother's behavior on the date
of the death of her child at the hands of her paramour. The
court considered the mother's actions over an extended period
of time, and found them to be totally wanting. In cases where
battered mothers are accused of failing to protect, the court
seems to have no difficulty looking at a broader course of con-
duct. However, the court's broader view seems to run only to
the mother's behavior and not that of the batterer to determine
" IR at 573."'id.
257 Id.
' Id. (footnote omitted). Leavens calls this "an undifferentiated causal responsi-
bility" and asserts that it is no better than the but-for analysis of causation, leaving us
with a universe of potentially liable actors much greater than the universe of indi-
viduals we are willing to punish. Id. at 574.
2" See id. at 583.
2" lM at 589.
-' 164 A.2d 467 (Md. 1960).
Id, at 473.
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how the abuser's behavior affected or influenced the mother's
ability to act.26
4
Whether society uses its common sense approach 26 5 or its
moral measurement of public expectation,268 there are different
levels of expectation as to who will undertake preventive con-
duct as a matter of routine.6 7 In this context,
[a] duty sufficient to support criminal sanctions must be founded on
both an empirically valid expectation that persons in similar circum-
stances will act to prevent a harm-the probability aspect of normality-
and also a deeply ingrained common understanding that society relies
on that individual to prevent the harm-the normative aspect of normal-
ity.
2 6 8
It is said, therefore, that parents have a duty to prevent harm to
their children because empirically, almost all parents act this
way, and normatively, our society will consider it reprehensible
if they do not.269 It is this combination of deviance--departing
from a pattern of regular performance, and reprehensibility-
being blameworthy-that makes us conclude that failure to act
caused the harm.270 The burden is on the fact-finder at trial to
determine whether the conduct in question is normal or the
status quo and whether it is abnormal or intrusive.271
A non-gendered analysis of causation poses a clear danger
for battered mothers. Society expects the battered mother to
' See Enos, supra note 120, at 229.
' See FLETCHER, supra note 220, § 8.2.1, at 593 (citing HART & HONORE, supra note
245), referring to H.L.A. Hart and A. Honore, who looked for the critical difference
between, for example, "killing" someone and "allowing them to die."
' Leavens, supra note 223, at 575 n.96. Leavens argues that Frankel, in contrast,
supported the notion of "an externally recognized legal duty as a basis for criminal
liability." IM
267 Leavens attempts to distinguish this causal definition from "external legal doc-
trines" and public policy arguments. Id. at 575. His definition looks instead to "how
society defines the status quo for that situation at that point in time, a determination
based both on probabilistic and normative factors." Id- However, it seems intuitively
wrong to suggest that by legally selecting certain relationships over others upon which
the law imposes a duty, probabilities and normative values were not taken into con-
sideration at the time the duty was established. See Frankel, supra note 220, at 378-81,
for discussion on the developing importance of the parental obligation.
' Leavens, supra note 223, at 575.
269 See id.
270 id.
Leavens acknowledges that the common sense approach to causation creates
difficulties in terms of determining what actually is the "common sense." I& at 570.
This decision is properly left to the jury to make. It allows the fact-finder wide lati-
tude to decide after looking at all of the facts in each particular case what conduct is
normal. I& at 569 n.74.
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prevent the harm and considers her reprehensible when she
does not.22 But how does the probabilistic analysis fit in with
the normative expectation? When the statement is made that
empirically almost all parents act in this way, what data are we
relying upon to reach this conclusion? What is the universe of
parenting the legal scholars and fact-finders have considered?
Is this, for example, the universe of parents whose offspring are
produced as a result of marital rape? Is it the universe of par-
ents where the batterer threatens the life of the woman if she in-
tervenes in the disciplining of the child? Is it the universe of
households where the mother herself has been beaten or tor-
tured or whose liberty is restricted in ways our "normative" fam-
ily cannot imagine? Is this empirical mother the 12-50% of
mothers who live in violent relationships? 273  Is it the mother
who left with her children on prior occasions, only to be hunted
down by the abuser when the courts and police offered no pro-
tection? No, traditionally, it has been the universe of the parent
whose curtains of privacy the court has continuously refused to
pierce. It is the universe of the "good" mother. When the
mother who does not fit the "empirical" category fails to act, it
can be easily seen as a "but-for" cause of the child's injuries or
death (one of many possible causes). But, stereotypical views
about mothers leave her without a way to demonstrate that she
is not the proximate cause of the child's injuries or death.
When we consider the acts of battered mothers, are our
common sense judgments about normality and the status quo
with regard to the rescue of her children appropriate?2 74 We
may be able to see that a batterer has the potential to engage in
violence against members of the household, including children.
We may also believe that it would be a sensible precaution for
the battered woman to leave the home, hopefully with the chil-
"' See, e.g., supra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing Palmer v. State, 164
A.2d 467 (Md. 1960)).
2* Mahoney, supra note 83, at 10 (citing MURRAYA. STRAUS ET AL., BEHmD CLOSED
DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERicAN FAMILY 36 (1980); LENORE WALKER, THE BATrERED
WOMAN 19 (1979)).
27 See infra Part IV. I suggest that they are neither appropriate nor realistic and
consequently the use of such judgments creates obstacles for the mother when jurors
assess the proximate cause between her conduct and the death of a child. See also
Lynne Henderson, Without Narrative: Child Sexual Abuse, 4 VA. J. Soc. PoLY & L. 479,
508 (1997) (examining the term "moral conventionalism" and indicating that what is
ordinarily assumed to be right and wrong, good and bad, has disadvantaged women
in the criminal process).
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dren. 5 If we incorporate this precaution into our standard
conceptualization of the status quo, we will make no allowance
for a woman's actual reality in comparison to our "normative"
notions of her reality when we encounter the woman who is
emotionally or physically unable to leave or has no place to go.
The law's readiness to rely on the community's common
sense understanding of how people are expected to act is and
has been problematic for women who are dealing with issues of
violence within the home. While the law no longer endorses a
husband's right to beat his wife, judges still express sympathy
towards men who beat or kill their wives and girlfriends.26 As
recently as 1981, the law had no regular mechanism to employ
in the fact-finding process to help understand the context of
violence in the battered women's life.2" In Florida, it was not
until 1993 that the court established women were entitled to
present expert evidence of battering.
C. MENS REA AND CRIMES OF OMISSION
Once the mother's act or non-act is established, her mens rea
must be evaluated. Mens rea, like the actus reus, is an indispensa-
ble element and must be established before criminal liability
can be assessed in any crime. 9 However, its precise meaning
"' Mahoney, supra note 83, at 5.
26 Compare Lynn H. Schafran, There's No Accounting ForJudges, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1063,
1063-67 (1995) (reporting comments of various judges when excusing male violence
towards women), with Smith v. Meyers, 74 N.W. 277, 278 (Neb. 1898) (stating the old
rule that the husband has the right to "chastise the wife [and] has the right to control
the wife with the lash"). Although jurisdictions recognized the need for the law to re-
flect society's growing enlightenment and departed from the "stick no wider than the
thumb rule," courts still sanctioned the husband's right to "punish" the wife for
"moderate correction." Sem e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453 (1868).
2" See Maguigan, supra note 125, at 427-28. A decade ago, most states had no exist-
ing body of law, apart from the rules of evidence pertaining to a decedent's past vio-
lence, which assisted the appellate courts in evaluating early claims of error in the
exclusion of battered woman syndrome evidence. Id.
' See State v. Hickson, 630 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1993). Prior to Hickson, Hawthorne v.
State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) was the controlling case. In Hawthorne,
the court ruled that the party offering the expert testimony was required to satisfy the
trial judge that the state of the art or scientific knowledge about battering was suffi-
ciently developed to permit a reasonable opinion to be given by an expert. Id. at 805-
06. Subsequent cases followed Hawthorne leaving it up to the individual trial judge to
determine whether the subject of BWS has gained general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community. SeeRogers v. State, 616 So. 2d 1098, 1098-99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
279 DRESSLER, supra note 125, at 95. In strict liability crimes, however, no mens rea
need be established. The actus reus is sufficient to establish liability. Id. at 117-19.
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has never been clearly understood.285 It has been variously de-
fined as a guilty state of mind, a "guilty or wrongful purpose," or
a "criminal intent.,281 In this sense, an actor is guilty of a crime
if she commits the actus reus of the offense with a morally
blameworthy state of mind.282 Mens rea also refers to the specific
mental state required in the definition of the offense. Every
criminal act, either explicitly or implicitly, contemplates a par-
ticular state of mind required for culpability under the relevant
statute. Under this elemental approach, a defendant is not
guilty of an offense, even if she has a culpable frame of mind, if
she lacks the mental state specified in the definition of the
crime."3
Under common law, crimes include not only those where
the results are the conscious object of the actor (intentional
acts), but also those where the actor knows the results are virtu-
ally certain to occur as a result of her conduct (those things of
which the actor has knowledge). 2 In crimes of commission,
mens rea can be generalized as an intention to bring about the
prohibited consequences or, at least, recklessness with regard to
the consequences.""
"The concept of mens rea, and its sub-concepts, intention
and recklessness, were constructed as generalizations of the in-
stances of liability for offenses of commission."2 It has been ar-
gued that the concepts cannot be fluently applied to offenses of
omission.87 The difficulty produced in a crime of omission is
that there is no conduct by which to measure the actor's state of
mind. Without first determining whether the actor knew of her
duty to act, attempting to determine her mens rea would be
senseless. Establishing appropriate mens rea in a crime of omis-
sion, however, goes beyond merely establishing knowledge or
ignorance of the duty to act.23 It must further be established
that the actor knew of the circumstances which triggered the
' Id. at 95-96 nn.2-3.
BLACK'S LAwDICIONARY985 (4th ed. 1968).
"'DRESSLER, supra note 125, at 95.
2nId at96.
mId- at 105-06.
See Hughes, supra note 228, at 600.
"DId- at 605-06.
7 Id. at 606.
" See LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 38, at 210.
1998]
634 MICHLLE S. JACOBS [Vol. 88
duty.2  In the case of omissions, I suggest that a third inquiry
could be added: Did the actor intend her behavior to constitute
a response to the circumstances which triggered the duty?
It would be difficult for a parent to argue that she should
not be held liable for failure to protect on the grounds that she
was unaware of her duty to protect her child. As a society we be-
lieve that parents are in the best position to know when a child
is in need. This is no less true if the parent is a battered
mother. Parental obligations to provide for and protect their
children is a concept solidly entrenched in the common law.m
Moreover, it seems morally appropriate to expect a parent to
fulfill her duty of care towards her child.21
On a practical level however, the logical extension of the
moral persuasion is not at all clear. What does it mean, exactly,
that the mother should know of her duty to protect, particularly
if by "duty to protect" what is really meant is an obligation to
preserve the child's life at all costs?
Indeed, some state statutes have held that mothers are
strictly accountable for knowledge of the duty to protect. 2
211 See Hughes, supra note 228, at 601-02. Hughes raises the hypothetical of a
pharmacist who sells a restricted drug without registering the sale. The question is
whether his act of selling the drug violates a statute requiring all restricted drug sales
to be registered. The pharmacist's guilt may either turn on whether he knew he had a
duty to report the sale or whether he knew that this particular drug was restricted,
thereby triggering his duty to register the sale.
2W See supra Part I.
" Cf. A.D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts For Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L.
REv. 1273 (1973) (examining the moral certainty of imposing the duty to rescue
upon persons who have close relationships to the endangered individual).
' See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1(c) (Michie 1997), as an example of a state which
uses a strict liability standard even though statutory provisions established a specific
level of mens rea. The statute in question provides:
Abuse of a child consists of a person knowingly, intentionally or negligently, and
without justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to be:
(1) placed in a situation that may endanger the child's life or health; or
(2) tortured, cruelly confined or cruelly punished ....
Id.
In State v. Lucero, the Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed the conviction of
Dorothy Lucero for the death of her child at the hands of her live-in boyfriend. 647
P.2d 406 (N.M. 1982). The mother attempted to present evidence that she was also
subject to the boyfriend's violence. Id. at 407. Expert testimony was offered to sup-
port a duress defense. The court ruled that the defense of duress is used to help
evaluate a defendant's state of mind. Id, at 408. However, despite the plain language
of the statute, Lucero's state of mind was held to be irrelevant, as the court inter-
preted § 30-6-1(c) to be one of strict liability. Id at 408-09. On its face, the statute
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Holding a defendant liable for murder on a strict liability basis
is a rare undertaking in criminal law.23 Such a departure vio-
lates the normal requirement that guilt be individually deter-
mined by evaluating the conscious desires of the defendant.
Severe punishment for offenses such as murder would normally
be unjust when it has not been determined that the defendant
intended to bring about the consequences of her acts.2
does not appear to require strict liability. However, the court cited cases as early as
1975 recognizing the statute as one of strict liability, stating that the public interest in
child abuse is so compelling that it overrides individual interests and common law re-
quirements that a mental element be established. Id. at 408.
Section 30-6-1(c) was challenged in State v. Santillanes, 849 P.2d 358 (N.M. 1993).
Vincent Santillanes was charged under subdivision (2) for causing injury to his
nephew. He slashed the boy's throat from ear to ear with a knife. Id. at 359. Santil-
lanes challenged the use of a negligence standard in lieu of a criminal one. Id. at
360. The Supreme Court of New Mexico agreed that it was improper for a criminal
statute to define conduct according to a civil negligence standard. Id. at 365. Santil-
lanes' conviction was upheld, but the court prohibited any further use of a civil negli-
gence standard. Re at 368. The State in Lucero was not required to demonstrate any
mens rea. Yet in the case of Santillanes, an active abuser, a mens rea was required, even
if only that of criminal negligence.
2- See Hughes, supra note 228, at 629 n.129. It is obviously not without precedent:
felony-murder, for example, is a strict liability offense in a sense. However, even in
this category there continues to be scholarly debate over the appropriateness of mur-
der charges based on strict liability. See, e.g., People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894 (Cal.
1994) (Bird, CJ., concurring) (strongly urging the court to abandon second degree
felony murder doctrine). Hawaii and Kentucky have completely abolished the felony
murder rule by statute. See HAw. REv. STAT. § 707-701 (1976); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
507.020 (Michie 1975); see also People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 321 (Mich. 1980)
(rejecting application of the felony murder principle through statutory interpreta-
tion). Other states have restricted its use to first-degree felonies which were enumer-
ated in common law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Exler, 89 A. 968 (Pa. 1914) (death
brought on by shock during commission of statutory rape is not murder, since statu-
tory rape, though a felony, is not a common law felony).
m Strict liability can be used against battered mothers when the state uses aiding
and abetting statutes, alleging that the mother's failure to act constituted aid to the
abuser. See People v. Peters, 606 N.E.2d 1201 (Ill. 1992). When charging aiding and
abetting, the state must show that the mother intended her behavior to encourage
and facilitate the abusing parent. It should not be sufficient to show merely that she
was present and aware of the abuse. The state must establish the causal connection
between the mother's knowledge and the death of the child. In the case of a battered
mother, it appears that the inference is too readily drawn that a mother's failure to
act is circumstantial evidence of her intent to encourage or facilitate the abuser's be-
havior as well as proof of the causal connection.
In Peters, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the law required proof that the
mother shared the intent of the principal and a common criminal design. Id. at 1235.
Because Peters continued to leave the child in the abuser's presence, the court found
she sanctioned the abuse and therefore shared a common design. Id. at 1232 (empha-
sis added). By relying on assumptions about what good mothers should do, courts
uphold liability simply because the child died rather than because the state estab-
lished that the mother intended the result or encouraged the abuser. This is strict
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Once it is established that the mother knew of her duty, the
second question in the mens rea trilogy can be asked: Did she
know that the circumstances leading up to the child's death
triggered the duty to act? This is a more complex question.
How does the court evaluate whether the mother should have
known that the event which led to the death of the child trig-
gers the duty to act such that a failure to act warrants murder li-
ability? The easiest case would be where the mother
intentionally refused to aid her child. When a mother has the
means and ability to help the child and does not because it is
her intention to permit the child's death, it makes sense to find
her liable for murder because she makes a conscious choice to
violate the mandate requiring her to act. This is the classic case
contemplated by the theory of omissions liability.
In the case of the battered mother, however, we have a de-
fendant who may not know that the actions of the abuser should
trigger her duty to act. The duration of the abuse over an ex-
tended period of time in and of itself may be sufficient to satisfy
the court that the abuse was severe enough to alert the mother
that her duty had been triggered. 29 Still, there is little in the
way of specific discussion on the point. In cases where the
abuser's violence has never been directed towards the children,
or the abuse has not been long term, or where the abuser's acts
did not appear life threatening, it is difficult to identify what
specifically should have alerted the mother to her duty to act.2
liability cloaked in the language of complicity. The Peters court ignored, for example,
evidence that the mother attempted to shift some child care responsibilities from the
abuser to a baby sitter. Id.
2- See People v. Bernard, 500 N.E.2d 1074, 1079 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
29 Violent men who have not previously directed their anger towards anyone in the
household except the mother can suddenly subject the children to violence as a way
to punish the mother. See Roberts, supra note 52, at 115; see also Dutton, supra note
125, at 1206-08 (stating that violence in the home does not always follow the cycle of
violence established by Lenore Walker, battering takes many different forms and sur-
prise attacks upon the children are within the realm of possibilities).
A parent's right to engage in corporal punishment is also at issue. A spanking
does not always qualify as abuse. Yet, when the child dies, in hindsight it can be in-
terpreted to be aggravated child abuse. For example, in the Zile case, Christina died
after she had been slapped by John Ziles. She cried and he covered her mouth to
quiet her. Her cause of death was asphyxia. Appellant's Initial Brief at 103, Zile (No.
95-2252). See also Differing Images Emerge in Zile Closing Arguments, FLA. SUN-SENTINL,
May 15, 1996, at 1B (reporting prosecutor's closing remarks during John Zile's trial
that Christina asphyxiated on her own vomit). If Pauline observed the slap and John
covering Christina's mouth, should that have alerted her that death was imminent?
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In none of the scenarios would it be obvious to the mother that
she needed to act in some way to protect her child.
The third inquiry asks whether the mother intended her ac-
tions to be a response to the events which triggered the duty to
protect. I believe this inquiry should be added because many
battered mothers have in fact acted, but the courts consistently
characterize their behavior as non-action. Describing the
mother's behavior as non-action is inaccurate. Her awareness of
the risk combined with the death of the child does not require
reaching the conclusion that she ignored the risk. In many in-
stances the mothers have observed or suspected that their chil-
dren were being abused by others, and they affirmatively
responded to the triggers of their duty to protect. In fact, it may
be that more of the mothers take affirmative steps than tradi-
tionally believed . 7 Responses may vary from trying to restruc-
ture the child's day to ensure less time is spent in the abuser's
presence,2 s to creating exaggerated stories to alert others to the
possibility of problems within the home,29 to actually leaving the
home. In some cases she may try to intervene physically or ver-
bally.3 It is difficult to recognize the women who act affirma-
tively in the case law, as the courts regularly fail or refuse to
recognize the actions of these women as affirmatively respond-
ing to the child's needs. To say that these women acquiesce in
the harm imposed upon their children or that they have en-
couraged it ignores all the evidence favorable to the women.
We no longer think battered women intend to be battered or
encourage their mates to abuse them. It is no more the inten-
tion of battered mothers that their children be killed than it is
the intention of battered women to be beaten.
Even if we were to analyze the battered mother's behavior
from the perspective of extreme recklessness, murder liability
2' See, e.g., Miccio, supra note 163, at 1102.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 515 A.2d 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
' In United States v. Webb, a wife was held captive by her husband after he beat
their child to death. 747 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1984). After he left for work, she
staged a break-in and told the husband she had been raped so that he would take her
to the emergency room. Id. At the hospital she told the emergency room physician
that her child had been killed. Id. The husband fled. She was prosecuted.
One of the Ziles' neighbors testified that she overheard Pauline say to John Zile,
"That's enough, John." See Appellant's Initial Brief at 12, Zile (No. 95-2252). De-
pending on what Pauline observed, it is conceivable that she satisfied her duty with
the statement.
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remains problematicssl In order for murder liability to be based
on recklessness, the conduct must be wanton or of a level of de-
praved indifference.s"' The reckless actor knew of a grave risk of
death or serious bodily injury and chose to ignore it. The bat-
tered mother has not ignored the risk to her child, but acts
within the limits of her ability in the face of the risk.
In the final analysis, it appears as though courts have short-
changed battered mothers when analyzing the mens rea compo-
nent of behavior alleged to be a murderous omission.
Insufficient distinctions are made between mothers who knew of
risks and those who either did not know or attempted to re-
spond to known risks. The death of the child clouds our ability
to focus on whether the mother violated the mandate to act or
whether she failed to save the child-a desirable end, but not
one required by the law.
D. IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE IN OMISSIONS CASES
The inquiry into whether a battered mother is capable of
performing the intervening act allows us to return to the ques-
tion of limitations on the duty to act. When the prosecution al-
leges that the mother failed to take any steps to protect the
child, the question must be asked whether the mother was ca-
pable of acting. Just as one may not be criminally liable on ac-
count of bodily movement which is involuntary, so one cannot
be criminally liable for failing to do an act which she is physi-
cally incapable of performing.0 5 As has been discussed previ-
'"' Murder liability under an omissions theory can also be based on the view that
the mother's failure to act constituted extreme recklessness. Under common law,
conduct must be malicious or of a level of depraved indifference to establish liability.
LAFAVE & ScoTt, supra note 38, at 606. The reckless actor knows of a grave risk of
death or serious bodily injury and chooses to ignore it. If we assume that a battered
mother knows of the risk to her child, her awareness of the risk combined with the
death of the child does not require reaching the conclusion that she ignored the risk.
In the scenario mentioned above, the mother took affirmative steps to minimize the
risks. It is wrong therefore to conclude that she ignored the risks. My thanks to
Christopher Slobogin for helping me flesh out this point.
The common law standard is restated in Model Penal Code § 210.2, which pro-
vides that "criminal homicide constitutes murder when committed ... recklessly un-
der circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1985). The reckless actor is punished because she pres-
ents as grave a danger to society as the intentional actor. She is an actor who knew of
a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury and chose to ignore it.
"o See United States v. Spingola, 464 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1972); LAFAVE & ScoTr, su-
pra note 38, at 208; see also PAUL ROBINSON, CRININAL LAw DEFENSES (1984 & Supp.).
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ously, a parent has a duty to feed her child and provide basic
necessities. The parent may be excused from liability for failure
to provide food and sustenance to the child if the parent, be-
cause of severe poverty, is unable to do so.m The example is
simple because poverty makes the parent physically incapable of
providing food. In other instances however, the exact meaning
of "capable of performance" is open to interpretation. It could
mean that the act is physically impossible or it could have a
broader meaning that includes mental incapability. Some fail-
ure to act legislation specifies that the act be one which the ac-
tor is physically capable of performing. 5 Other jurisdictions
have deleted the word "physically," apparently barring omissions
liability on the basis of any incapacity.w In considering omis-
sions liability against mothers who have been battered, the dis-
tinction between mental incapability and physical impossibility
is extremely important.
1. Mental Incapacity
The availability of an incapability defense as opposed to an
impossibility defense would theoretically be of assistance to bat-
tered mothers. Assume defense counsel could establish success-
fully that the mother was battered in the home. If the threshold
levels of proof were met, the mother might then be able to in-
troduce evidence concerning not only the nature of domestic
violence but also the myriad of ways in which her behavior
might be affected by the violence.Y7 Such evidence could in-
Stehr v. State, 139 N.W. 676 (Neb.), aff'd on rehg, 142 N.W. 670 (Neb. 1913).
The parent will still be liable if assistance is available from welfare or charity and the
parent fails to seek or obtain that assistance.
See, e.g., People v. Hager, 476 N.Y.S.2d 442, 447 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1984) (noting the
minimum requirement for criminal liability for failure to perform an act is physical
capability); State v. Olson, 355 N.W.2d 110, 112 (N.D. 1984) (stating conviction is
precluded for a strict liability crime of hit-and-run where defendant lacked the mental
or physical ability to perform the required act). The Model Penal Code in § 201(1)
provides for criminal liability for the "omission to perform an act of which [a person]
is physically capable." MODEL PENAL CODE § 201(1) (1985). Professor Robinson has
criticized the Model Penal Code language because it can lead to ambiguity as to
whether the actor who is physically capable but mentally unable is excused. See
ROBINSON, supra note 224, at 200.
Only five states have done so: Alaska, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon and Utah. See
ROBINSON, supra note 224, at 200 n.8.
m7 This could include testimony concerning many different behaviors that occur as
a result of battering, included but not limited to "learned helplessness." See Dutton,
supra note 125, at 10-13.
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clude expert testimony which would aid the fact-finder in evalu-
ating the mother's state of mind to determine whether she had
the capability of protecting a child in the same violent house-
hold. The test of incapability has the advantage of being subjec-
tive-it is focused on the actor herself-as opposed to a
scientific analysis of whether the act is literally possible of being
performed308
The battered mother should legitimately be able to raise
her own exposure to violence within the home to help explain
why she did not or could not act to save the child. At the ex-
treme end, if there is evidence that the mother was mentally in-
capable of protecting her child, she might present an insanity
defense. However, attempting to use insanity as a defense pres-
ents theoretical and ideological obstacles. In the first instance,
the mother's behavior may not fit the threshold definition of in-
sanity. Under the most commonly recognized definition of in-
sanity, the actor must be laboring under such a defect of reason
or a disease of the mind that she (1) did not know the nature
and quality of the act she was doing, or (2) did not know what
she was doing was wrong'0 In the context of the mother who is
battered, she does know, in many instances, what she is doing,
and therefore she would not be able to meet the first prong of
the test. In addition, even where the mother has been terror-
ized and reasonably chose not to act, jurors may still believe that
it was wrong for her to fail to prevent the death of her 
child.310
From an ideological perspective, arguing that the battered
mother is insane denies the reality of her existence. Such an
argument undermines any attempt to have the focus on respon-
sibility for violence within the home placed on the abuser as
opposed to the abused.
"' See ROBINSON, supra note 224, at 200 (suggesting that this standard may be too
liberal). Professor Robinson states that if society demands a minimum level of self re-
straint against internal and external pressures to commit an offense, society can also
properly demand a minimum level of effort or sacrifice in performing a legally re-
quired act. Id. His view is that the actor's personal incapacity ought to be recognized
as a defense only where it satisfies either a requirement analogous to the voluntari-
ness requirement for commission offenses or a requirement analogous to those of a
general excuse such as insanity or duress. Id.
0 See DRESSLER, supra note 125, at 299.
310 See infra note 353 and accompanying text (narrative of Carolyn).
640 [Vol. 88
BAT7ERED WOMEN
Alternatively, one legal scholar has suggested the possibility
of a diminished capacity defense for mothers."' The term di-
minished capacity has more than one meaning in the law.3 12 For
battered mothers, the intended meaning is the defense of "par-
tial responsibility." Under a partial responsibility defense, mur-
der may be reduced to manslaughter if it is committed as the
result of "extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which
there is a reasonable explanation or excuse." 13 Currently, di-
minished capacity defenses of this type are not recognized in
mostjurisdictions. Applying the concept of diminished capacity
to battered mothers would permit the mothers to be held to
their duty to protect the children, while at the same time per-
mitting them to be excused from liability for murder.1 4 Women
who meet the criteria for diminished capacity should be permit-
ted to introduce evidence on this issue. However, battered
mothers should not be limited to this defense. Such an effort
would continue the attempts to enforce the stereotypical view of
lawbreaking women as being either mad or bad,315 and restrict
women's options for defenses that are readily available to
316men.
Attempts to use other traditional excuse defenses such as
duress or coercion have not been successful for the battered
mother.1 7 The excuse of duress is based upon the existence of a
311 See Becker, supra note 88, at 21-22.
M Diminished capacity is a legal term of art used to describe two categories of cir-
cumstances in which a defendant's abnormal mental condition, short of insanity, will
exonerate him or, more often, result in his conviction of a crime or degree of crime
less serious than the original charge. See DRESSLER, supra note 125, at 319. There is a
mens rea form of diminished capacity that negates the inens rea element of the case-in-
chief. This is not a true defense. Id. The other version of diminished capacity is the
partial responsibility. Id.
' Id. at 325.
Becker admits that a battered mother may not deserve a diminished capacity
type of defense. See Becker, supra note 88, at 21. While she calls for even-handed ap-
plication of discretionary standards when mothers are defendants, she acknowledges
that the law today does not reflect even-handedness. Id. at 22.
"1 See supra Part II.
316 Schneider, Resistance, supra note 91, at 495-96 (commenting on efforts to restrict
self defense options for women who kill violent partners).
,1 See Erickson, supra note 209, at 203 (citing United States v. Webb, 747 F.2d 278
(5th Cir. 1984), where a battered mother unsuccessfully attempted to use the defense
of coercion). Erickson views this as a possible consequence of the law either being
interpreted too narrowly or too rigidly, thereby failing to encompass the type of coer-
cion experienced by battered women. See id. See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Syn-
dromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DuKE LJ. 461 (1996).
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threat made against the life of the defendant or the life of a
loved one. The threat must be one of immediate or imminent
death or serious bodily injury.318 In the case of battered moth-
ers, the very existence of the threat may be an issue. While the
woman may understand, based on the abuser's past perform-
ance, that interference may cause injury to herself or further in-
jury to the child, the batterer may not have expressly stated a
threat on the specific day of the death or injury.319 A previous
threat or a threat of future harm is normally insufficient to ex-
cuse the mother's behavior on the specific day of the child's
death. However, in the context of a violent home, the threat of
future violence may legitimately create a very real and reliable
barometer of impending violence, particularly if the woman
continues to engage in the behavior, e.g., resisting the violence
against herself or her children, which escalates the severity of a
violent attack.
Duress is also predicated upon the defendant being a per-
son of reasonable firmness. Here the battered mother con-
fronts the troublesome issue of whether someone who "allows"
themselves and their children to be battered can be found to be
reasonable.32 The human bias against the experiences of bat-
tered women makes it difficult to convince laypeople, as well as
judges and prosecutors, that the mother, for example, was not a
Mosteller argues that special consideration.ought to be made for battered women be-
cause of societal recognition of their plight and the disparate impact law can have on
them. While I agree with Mosteller's conclusion that evidence of the woman's state of
mind as a result of exposure to battery should be admitted, I disagree that this treat-
ment should be considered as extending "special consideration" to women. Rather, it
should be understood as correcting hundreds of years of legal history where both the
written law and the judges who interpreted it denied application of existing principles
of criminal law to women who killed spouses or intimates.
3,8 See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 38, at 436. Threatened future harm will not suf-
fice, nor will non-serious bodily harm or property damage. Id. It is an affirmative de-
fense that an actor engaged in conduct charged to constitute a crime because she was
coerced to do so by the use of, or threat to use, unlawful force against her person or
the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness would have been un-
able to resist. SeeDRESSLER, supra note 125, at 270-71.
"' See Erickson, supra note 209, at 202. The question then becomes what can the
mother rely on in the absence of an express and immediate threat? Does the state-
ment, "If you interfere, I will kill you" constitute a threat? Depending on whether the
court is looking at this one isolated incident or the whole spectrum of violence, the
statement may not be viewed as a "threat," or at least not an immediate threat.
'" The defense is unavailable if the actor succumbed to pressure that would not
move a person of reasonable firmness. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 38, at 432.
Similarly, if the actor places herself recklessly or negligently in a situation where she
will be subjected to duress, the defense will be unavailable to her. Id. at 433.
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weak woman easily pressured by her intimate partner or that she
did not recklessly place herself in a situation where she would
be subjected to coercion or duress.32
2. Physical Impossibility
Reliance on a "physically capable" provision presents a
much more difficult case for a mother who has been battered if
"physically capable" is defined in the objective sense. That is,
can a human perform the act in question? What does it mean
that someone is physically capable of performing an act? As-
sume that an object falls on a child (an independent process) in
the presence of the child's mother. Assume further that the ob-
ject weighs 300 pounds. The mother can lift only 150 pounds.
If she does not try to lift the object, can we say that she has
failed to protect the child? Such a result would seem unjust
since we know she was not physically capable of doing so, even
though there is someone alive .in the universe who could do
so.322 There is no logical reason why physical impossibility could
not be expanded to accommodate a more subjective standard s
This is an area where feminist legal theorists may be able to con-
tinue to press for consideration of women within the normative
universe.
At a different level, we may also ask whether it is possible
that a history of abuse led the mother to believe that it is im-
probable that any intervention by her would protect the child.
Therefore she would conclude that it is impossible to protect
the child. Evidence demonstrating the real and substantial fear
that the batterer generates for the mother should be admissible.
The common expectation may be that all she has to do in order
to satisfy her duty is pick up the phone and call the police.324
321 Battered women who kill an intimate partner and try to avail themselves of the
traditional justification defense, self defense, encounter parallel difficulties. They
must overcome the assumptions that they were weak women or that they could have
just left the violent home. See Mahoney, supra note 83, at 61-63.
-, We shall assume for these purposes that there is no one else to whom she can
turn for assistance and that she did not cause the object to fall on the child.
*2 See Erickson, supra note 209, at 205. Erickson states that it is unclear what a
woman would need to establish in order to raise a physical impossibility defense suc-
cessfully. Would she have to show the batterer was armed and she was not? That he
was 6'2" and drunk and she is 5'4"? These questions are difficult in part because no
serious scholarly attention has been devoted to them by the criminal law theorists.
".. This is similar to the expectation that a battered woman can just leave to escape
further abuse. See Mahoney, supra note 83, at 64.
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Courts scour the evidence looking for any conceivable opportu-
nities when the mother "could have gotten help" as opposed to
focusing on the many instances where the futility of seeking
help was demonstrated. Yet the battered mother's options are
rarely as simple as "picking up the phone. "ss Her fear can affect
her ability to feel safe enough to "pick up the phone."
People v. Bernarcd26 provides an interesting look at this issue.
Bernard's two children had been sexually abused by her boy-
friend. She was charged and convicted of aggravated battery.3 2
The Bernard court noted in its opinion that the boyfriend was
6'3," weighed 225 pounds, and was a bouncer at a bar.3 28 The
court emphasized the size of the defendant to show that he was
capable of inflicting great harm on the children and that be-
cause of his size the mother should have known of the risk of in-
jury to the children3s 9 The opinion contains no similar physical
description of the mother. Perhaps the mother's size might
help explain why she did not intervene or why actions she did
take were not effective intervention. A witness testified that on
one occasion the mother asked the abuser if the child could be
taken to the doctor, but he refused to allow it.ss° As we have
seen elsewhere, the Bernard court conflated the mother's duty to
act with an unspoken requirement that she save the child from
death. Thus, small attempts undertaken by the mother were
seen as ineffective and therefore equivalent to non-action. This
is yet another instance where gendered implications of a crimi-
nal defense have not been explored or developed.
3. Risk of Injury to the Mother
Related to the issue of possibility is the question of the
amount of inconvenience, expense and risk that the rescuer
must undergo in order to fulfill her duty to act. A parent must
doubtlessly expose herself to a higher risk to save her child than
does a person who has no relationship to the child.331 At the
'. The mother may be imprisoned within the home, or denied access to telephone
and neighbors. See narratives infra Part IV.
'26500 N.E.2d 1074 (1986).
s[ 1d
2- Id. at 1076.
S29 Id.
Id. at 1075.
"' LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 38, at 209.
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same time there has been a clear recognition in the law that a
parent is not required to risk his or her own life or be subjected
to serious bodily injury.s3 2 However, what factual situations may
circumscribe the responsibility? Requiring that the mother act
to protect her child is quite different from requiring that the
mother act to save her child s. s Judicial opinions offer little
guidance for distinguishing between the two, and no analysis
can be found on this point in the states where failure to protect
statutes have been enacted. In the vacuum created by the lack
of guidance, women who are in battering relationships are find-
ing that no steps they take are found to be "reasonably possible"
under the circumstances. This is consistent with the difficulties
women and mothers face when they attempt to have the stories
of the violence they experience heard in judicial forums. The
efforts of these women to protect themselves and their children
are often heroic, but receive little credence when evaluated by
the courts and compared with the violence of the batterer to-
wards the child.-ss
IV. BATTERING AND DETERMINATIONS OF REASONABLENESS
I pray that everyone who ever knew and will know me will forgive me for not being a
strong person.'
Mothers who are battered confront the same thorny issue as
battered women who kill: can their behavior be seen as reason-
2 See State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982) (despite upholding the convic-
tion of a woman whose boyfriend killed her child, the court rejected the notion that
parents have the duty to place their own lives at risk).
'- See fLErcER, supra note 220, at 626 (discussing the grammatical complications
of trying to use action words of commission in the failure to act context). To prohibit
someone from killing is very different from commanding them to preserve a life. Id.
at 583. See also Hughes, supra note 228, at 599.
' See Enos, supra note 120, at 242-43. Enos gives the example of a Minnesota case
of aiding and abetting a rape. Despite the fact that the mother sought help from
Minnesota Police and the Child Protective Services and attempted to obtain a civil
order of protection against the abuser, she was convicted of aiding and abetting her
daughter's rape by the abuser. But see State v. Mott, 901 P.2d 1221 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that trial court improperly excluded testimony regarding BWS and its
impact on the mother's ability to make decisions to protect her child); Barrett v.
State, 675 N.E.2d 1112 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing trial court ruling that BWS
evidence only was admissible for self defense but was not relevant when the victim,
the child, was a third party).
" Folks, supra note 2, at 1B (quoting Pauline's letter).
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able?sss The issue of reasonableness of the battered mother's
behavior is one for the jury. The fact-finder's wide latitude in
these cases highlights the need and importance of fashioning an
appropriate defense which will accurately portray the mother's
circumstances for the jury. However, what the jury hears is
shaped by the trial judge through procedurals and evidentiary
rulings,3 39 as well as by his instructions to the jury.m The trial
court is guided, as are jurors, by the cultural and stereotypical
view of mother as the selfless protector of the child.3' Adher-
336 See Schneider, Resistance, supra note 91, at 499-501 (noting all the conflicting
views of whether women's behavior should be viewed as reasonable).
3'7 Schneider states that for battered women who kill the issue of reasonableness
has a critical impact on the choice of defense. I&. at 501. To the extent defense
counsel, due to stereotypical imagery of battered women cannot conceive of the
woman's actions as reasonable, it is unlikely that counsel will suggest a defense which
requires developing and presenting evidence of reasonableness. Id.
'" See Maguigan, supra note 125, at 439. Maguigan enumerates four procedural
inquiries made by the court which can have an impact on a battered woman's ability
to have the jury consider self defense: (1) how much evidence must the woman pres-
ent in order to be entitled to the instruction; (2) what is the source of her evidence;
(3) what is the scope of the evidence; and (4) whether the evidence is of sufficient
quality. Id. She states that judges vested with the power to make full credibility deci-
sions can become obstacles to the woman's ability to have the jury receive the self-
defense instruction. Id
9 IM at 421-31, 451-58 (discussion of impact of evidentiary rulings, particularly as
to the batterer's propensity for violence and the use of expert witnesses). See Parrish,
supra note 125; see also Mosteller, supra note 317, at 470-71 & n.33.
3' See State v. Rundle, 500 N.W.2d 916 (Wis. 1993). Rundle objected to one of the
instructions given on the grounds that it allowed jurors to find guilt without weighing
his individual intent. The instruction as read by the court provided: "If you are satis-
fied beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in this case that eitherdefendant, as
a party to the crime, intentionally caused bodily harm to [the child] ... you should
find the defendant guilty." Id at 989 n5 (emphasis added). The court did not reach
the issue as it reversed on other grounds.
During Pauline's charging conference, the state requested an instruction that be-
cause Pauline was the natural mother of Christina she had a heightened duty. See TR,
supra note 9, at 2534-37. The court denied the instruction, yet in its closing, the state
referred repeatedly to the fact that Pauline was Christina's natural mother and should
have protected her like any natural mother would have. See ido at 2624, 2629-30. Trial
counsel failed to object during the closing and the court took no action sua sponte. In
effect, the state got the instruction it wanted.
It is hard to evaluate what effect the comments had on the jurors. However, once
deliberations began the jurors asked only four questions. Two of the questions re-
lated to instructions on the murder charge including one where they inquired if
"standing by and doing nothing" could be considered causing bodily harm. See Ap-
pellant's Initial Brief at 21, Zile (No. 95-2252); Stephanie Smith, ZileJuiy Struggles to
Clarify Issues, Jury Queries Jude About Accomplice Theory, FI-4- SUN-SENTINE, Apr. 11,
1995, at lB.
See generally Roberts, supra note 52; Schneider, Resistance, supra note 91. See also
Schafran, supra note 276 (detailing the reactions of some male judges to domestic vio-
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ence to stereotypical views can impede the court's ability to
evaluate probative evidence on the issue of reasonableness.3 "
The inequitable results that develop are demonstrated in
Johnson v. Iorida.3 " In Johnson, the mother's boyfriend killed
her child. The mother entered a plea of nolo contendre to the of-
fense of manslaughter.3 " Yet there was ample evidence that the
mother was unable to prevent the abuse, and that she herself
had a loving and protective relationship with the child.M At
sentencing, the state's attorney took the position that Johnson
was not similarly situated to the boyfriend and that there was no
evidence in the record to indicate that the mother helped per-
petuate the abuse or desired the death of the child.3 6 Yet, the
sentencing judge not only ignored the state's advocacy, but de-
parted from recommended guidelines and sentenced the
mother to the maximum time permitted by law.3 In Johnson,
where both the known facts and the support of the state were
lence which skewers justice and endangers women). Such sympathies were certainly
used by the prosecutor in the Zile case. Thejurors were urged to speculate on what it
was like for Christina the day she died. See Appellant's Initial Brief at 139, Zile (No.
95-2252). The state commented that Christina did not have the opportunity to have a
judge and a lawyer protecting her as Pauline did. I. at 138.
"2 Similar problems occurred (and to some extent still occur) at the trial level
when abused women seek to introduce prior beatings as evidence that their behavior
at the time of the killing of an abusive spouse was reasonable. For many years, courts
excluded testimony that demonstrated years of ongoing abuse contributed to a sense
of imminent death or serious bodily injury. This prevented juries from evaluating the
testimony which might have established the reasonableness of the women's actions.
See Maguigan, supra note 125, at 415; see also State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C.
1989). Because a court cannot envision a situation where a woman can be in immi-
nent fear of death or serious bodily injury when the spouse is asleep, it excludes, as a
matter of law, introduction of history of abuse on the issue of reasonableness. See also
Henderson, supra note 274, at 480-81 (indicating the difficulty societal attitudes to-
wards sexual violence in allowing children's voices to be heard in sexual abuse cases).
508 So. 2d 443 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
344Nolo contendre is a plea which may be entered, with leave of the court, to a crimi-
nal complaint or indictment by which the defendant does not admit or deny the
charges, though a fine or sentence may be imposed pursuant to it. A plea of nolo con-
tendre may not be used against the defendant in a civil action based upon the same
acts.
Id. at 444 (ZehmerJ., dissenting).
Id. (Zehmer, J., dissenting).
The recommended sentencing range was from three to seven years. Id. at 445
(Zehmer,J., dissenting). The trialjudge sentenced the mother to 15 years in prison.
In making its ruling the court stated that the mother either administered the fatal
beating or allowed it to be administered, despite the fact that no evidence suggested
she had done so. The court further stated that the mother had abandoned or abdi-
cated the care, nurturance and protection of her child-again, despite the evidence
in the record to the contrary. I4 at 446 (ZehmerJ., dissenting).
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behind the mother, she was still penalized by the trial court be-
cause she did not "save" her child.
In State v. Walden, as well, there was conflicting testimony as
to whether the children were beaten by the mother's current
boyfriend or the children's father.34 There was testimony that
on an occasion when the mother intervened she was struck and
her face was beaten and bruised3 9 Yet, in the court's opinion
that fact was not connected to the fact that the children were
beaten in her presence. As represented, the mother was made
to appear as if she took no reasonable steps to prevent the
abuse.5 0
In a review of the cases of women charged with failure to
protect, no women were excused from liability.?' None of these
cases explain what behavior by the mothers might constitute
"every step reasonably possible." Can society envision and ac-
cept a situation in which the mother does not offer her own life
to save that of her child? Case law indicates it is difficult for the
court to reach that conclusion. ' Legal scholars must begin to
describe and explain the reactions of the mothers as being rea-
soned actions. Though that may go against the grain of the
3 State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982). The children testified that the
boyfriend beat them. Id at 783. In contrast, Walden's father testified that the chil-
dren's father beat them. Id.
349 d.
330 Evaluation of steps taken by mothers in these situations follows a pattern of
trivialization by the courts-a pattern also seen in cases when women were battered.
See, e.g., People v. Bernard, 500 N.E.2d 1074 (Il. App. Ct. 1986), where testimony
indicated that the mother asked the abuser's permission to seek medical attention
and borrowed money from neighbors to get to the hospital. Her actions were not
viewed as active steps taken on behalf of the children. This pattern was also pointed
out by Natalie Loder Clark in Crime Begins At Home: Let's Stop Punishing Victims and Per-
petrating Vilence 28 WM. & MARYL. REV. 263, 289 (1987). Clark provides examples of
lawyers' characterizing violent episodes in the home as trivial events, so that the
women's responses will seem unreasonable and disproportionate. Id. Clark also
points out that when the victim does not leave the home the court views her action as
the equivalent of consenting to the violence. Id. at 288. Similarly, a mother's inability
to extricate her children from the hands of an abuser is interpreted as her consent to
ongoing abuse. See Enos, supra note 120, at 240-57.
's, See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 747 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1984); Boone v. State, 668
S.W.2d 17 (Ark. 1984); Johnson v. State, 508 So. 2d 443 (F]. Dist. Ct. App. 1987);
People v. Stanciel, 606 N.E.2d 1201 (Ill. 1992); People v. Novy, 597 N.E.2d 273 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992); People v. Bernard, 500 N.E.2d 1074 (111. App. Ct. 1986).
'2 Indeed, a similar observation is made by Schneider in reference to battered
women. See Schneider, Resistance, supra note 91, at 504-05 (noting that both judges
and legal scholars manifest discomfort with the notion that battered women who kill
can claim their actions are "objectively" reasonable).
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"child savers," the approach is consistent with a sound criminal
law theory. Consider the following narrative:
I'm here because my husband wanted to kill me, and since he couldn't,
he killed my baby instead. He knows that I'd rather be dead than have
my child dead, so this worked out better for him. I have lost all of my
children now, and it will be a slow death for as long as I live knowing that
he took the one thing I've ever had as my own. It started one afternoon
when I was sleeping in a very deep sleep because he kept me up for two
days in a row. I hadn't been out of his sight for almost three years. Can
you imagine that He locked me in when he went out, and mostly we
stayed home. The beatings were a regular part of our life, so when he
called me, I was trained tojump up and run to him. This day he told me
that our son had fallen and hit his head on the edge of the table. I took
one look at him and knew that he hit him with something, and that my
son was in serious trouble. He died waiting in the same emergency room
that I had been in two nights before after my husband tried to kill me.
He wouldn't even let me hold my son as he died. I don't remember what
happened after that except that I was screaming that my husband killed
my son and that the hospital let him die. My husband was arrested there,
and four days later at my son's funeral, I was arrested and brought to
Riker's Island. He told the detectives that Ihit my son on the head with
a hammer that the police found in the trash-can in our kitchen. They
said both our fingerprints were on it. Maybe they were, but I did not kill
my son! Now he has taken everything from me. I've spent my life run-
ning from one hit to another. I've been beaten up since I've been here
too .... Everyone hates a woman who sleeps while her child is being
killed. The only reason I don't hate myself is because I don't even exist
anymore after twelve years of being abused.'
Or, consider another version of violence:
My husband started abusing my son when I wouldn't have sex. When he
started hurting my son, I started trying to fight back and protect my son,
but that only made things worse. He beat both of us worse than ever.
He told me he would call my welfare worker and say Iwas the one hurt-
ing my son if I told the police. He sounded really convincing, and I be-
lieved him. He did things like burn my son with hot water in the bathtub
while I was tied up on the bed. I lied to the neighbors sometimes, but I
think they knew ... My welfare was cut off because I missed my face-to-
face [meeting] because I was so badly beaten.... One day we were all
hungry, and my son was crying. He beat him so badly I was really scared.
He tied him up and made me have sex while my son was under the bed.
When it was over, I rushed to get my son, but he wasn't breathing. He
screamed, "Look what you did, you killed him." That's all I remember. I
was crying and screaming for what seemed like a day.... When I threat-
See RicHm, supra note 63, at 108 (the narrative of "Carolyn" who was arrested for
first degree murder in the death of her child); see also Roberts, supra note 52, at 121-
25 (vulnerability of other family members to be used as hostages by the abuser).
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ened to tell the truth he went to my grandmother's house and beat her
almost to death as a way to keep me quiet ....
The plight of these women and their children is almost too
painful to read. Yet, the narratives illustrate several points: (1)
violence towards the child may be unexpected and reflect an es-
calation in violence previously directed only at the mother-this
raises a question of whether the mother knew or should have
known that her child was at risk; (2) the mothers are not neces-
sarily passive observers of their children's death-in some cases
they may be physically unable to help; and (3) above all else,
given the abuser's propensity to violence, the mother's behavior
was reasonable. By reasonable, I mean that the mother, based
on the information available to her at the time, can form a rea-
sonable belief that further intervention would create the risk of
death or serious bodily injury to herself or increase the risk of
harm to her child. If her determination is correct, then she
should not be held liable for the death of the child. Her action
or inaction should be seen as justifiable.""5 A reading of the nar-
ratives of both women requires neither an argument for dimin-
ished capacity nor one of coercion or duress, but can and
should fit squarely within the accepted standards of reasonable
behavior in a jurisdiction that uses a subjective or hybrid stan-
dard of reasonableness."6 In a state with a purely objective
standard of reasonableness, battered mothers, like other bat-
35 R4cIE, supra note 63, at 106-07 (the narrative of Sebina, who was arrested for
second degree murder for failure to protect).
" There is considerable debate as to whether acts committed by a battered woman
can bejustifiable. Schneider, Resistance, supra note 91, and Maguigan, supra note 125,
argue, for example, that in some instances when a battered woman kills her spouse,
her actions are justifiable under standard self-defense claims. George Fletcher argues
that the acts are only excusable. George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory ofJustifi-
cation and Excuse 57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 553 (1996). See also Claire Finkelstein, Self-Defense
as a RationalExcuse, 57 U. PT. L. REv. 621 (1996). However Fletcher's and Finkel-
stein's views are challenged as misunderstanding the problem. See, e.g., Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Self-Defense, Domination, and the Social Gontract, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv. 579
(1996); David Gauthier, Self-Defense and the Requirement of Imminence: Comments on
George Fletcher's Domination in the Theory ofJustification and Excuse, 57 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 615 (1996).
-- This fits in with Leavens' notion of causality occurring on a continuum rather
than being judged from a single isolated event. Leavens, supra note 223, at 584. If
our picture of time, for example, is the moment that Carolyn realizes her child is
hurt, her risk does not appear that great. If our window, however, stretches back far-




tered women, may find it difficult to raise issues of abuse in
their own defense.s
Courts have characterized the behavior of battered mothers
as being unreasonable because allegedly the mothers "did noth-
ing" when their children were killed. However, there are at
least three ways-besides actually doing nothing-in which a
mother can be viewed as "doing nothing." In the first narrative
the mother "did nothing" because she was not present during
the abuse and had no prior notice of it. The second narrative is
that of a mother who "did nothing" because she knew of the
abuse but appeared unable to do anything about it. The third
potential category of mothers who "do nothing" are those who
have attempted to do something to protect their children but
were unsuccessful. The courts remain unable to distinguish be-
tween a mother who truthfully does nothing because she does
not care and the three types of mothers identified here. Rarely
is there an effort to distinguish among them.s On those occa-
sions where a court does recognize that the mother made an ef-
fort, it frequently trivializes the measures undertaken by the
mother.s 9 Therefore, for the mother there can be no set of
facts upon which she can successfully argue that further action
placed her at risk of death or serious bodily injury.
1 See Maguigan, supra note 125, at 424-25 (showing that most states use either a
subjective standard or a standard incorporating both subjective and objective compo-
nents). In those states using a purely objective standard, particularly those combining
objectivity with a requirement of immediate danger, battered women seem to have a
more difficult time getting evidence introduced. Id. at 413 n.116.
3 See Enos, supra note 120, at 240-54 (describing the approaches of various
courts); see also People v. Bernard, 500 N.E.2d 1074 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (providing an
example of the way the courts have commonly obscured the difference between the
two). The Bernard court concluded the mother did not ask for help from a neighbor
who was present or from a motel maid who interacted with mother. I& at 1078. Yet,
the testimony cited by the court contradicted this assertion. The neighbor who wit-
nessed some of the acts of violence, without notifying the police himself, testified that
the mother was struck in the face and thrown against a wall on one occasion when she
intervened. Id. at 1075. And though the maid said the mother never told her of the
abuse, she also testified that the mother asked for a ride to her place of employment
and stated that the mother hoped to be able to get from there to the hospital so that
her child could receive treatment. Id. at 1076. This is not the same as doing nothing.
The court's analysis correlates to the myths and assumptions outlined by Enos, supra
note 120, at 240-57 (indicating courts endorse myth that friends and relatives are
willing to give the mother assistance).
" Enos, supra note 120, at 258-60 (discussing judicial assumptions that the moth-
ers' fears are unjustified, unbelievable and exaggerated and that the abuser does not
pose grave danger to the mothers).
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The strength of the cultural belief that mothers should go
to whatever lengths are required to save a child, including
death, are echoed in the words of the corrections officer who
prepared Pauline Zile's pre-sentence report. The corrections
officer stated, "[i] n my opinion it is atrocious for a mother not
to risk her life-everything, to save her child." 'w When we re-
quire the mother in an abusive relationship to rescue the child
at any cost, we deprive her of the right to make a reasonableness
assessment, a right given to any other defendant faced with po-
tentially life threatening choices.361
Any effort to portray the battered mother's inability to save
the life of her child as reasonable will meet stiff resistance from
the public. The resistance was and continues to be demon-
strated in the public's unwillingness to view as reasonable the
defensive behavior of women trapped in violent telationships."2
Studies of juror attitudes toward battered women underscore
the difficulty that jurors have in applying a general standard of
reasonableness to women.m This resistance led some feminist
Presentence Report, supra note 216, at 12. The officer also stated that the only
mitigating factor she found on Pauline's behalf was that she had no prior criminal in-
volvement. It was the officer's opinion that the crime was "heinous, atrocious and
cruel" because the victim was her daughter. Id at 11. The officer recommended that
Pauline be put to death. The ongoing abuse and Pauline's references of being abused
herself were trivialized in the officer's report and, despite some clear common indica-
tors of abuse such as the controlling nature ofJohn's behavior, the officer interpreted
Pauline's knowledge of the abuse as consent to it. See id. at 11-12. See generally Clark,
supra note 350, at 288-89.
" That would place a mother above and beyond what black letter law calls for in
omission cases. See supra Part III. Even in civil law jurisdictions, where bystanders
have an affirmative obligation to rescue, no country requires the rescuer, even if re-
lated, to risk death or serious injury. Yet, this is exactly what we expect and require
from mothers.
M2 But see Mosteller, supra note 317, at 480 n.60, who cautions that even if battered
women's conduct was seen as common or frequent, its commonality would not re-
quire a finding that the conduct was legally reasonable. The law incorporates ele-
ments of morality into the legal standard such that common conduct may still violate
moral principles. Id. It appears that the unspoken moral value for the battered
mother is that she should forfeit her own life for her child's. The question then, is
whether the law should support that value? I do not believe it should.
3' See Alana Bowman, A Matter ofJustice: Overcoming Juror Bias in Prosecutions of Bat-
terers Through Expert Witness Testimony of the Common Experiences of Battered Women, 2 S.
CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 219 (1992); Edith Green et al., Jurors' Knowledge of Bat-
tered Women, 4J. FAM. VIOLENCE 105 (1989); Charles P. Ewing & Moss Aubrey, Battered
Woman and Public Opinion: Some Realities About the Myths, 2 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 257
(1987). "Studies show that when no expert testimony on battered women's syndrome
is presented," male jurors are less likely than female jurors to believe the battered fe-
male. Lorrie L. Luellig, WyJ.E.B. v. T.B. will Fail to Advance Equality: A Call for Dis-
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scholars to argue that a separate standard of reasonableness
based on women's experiences should be created. Though
some courts entertained the argument, most jurisdictions have
rejected a separate standard.s The tension between the argu-
ments for a single standard of reasonableness and a separate
standard continue because the law has not yet accepted the
normality of violence within women's lives. By arguing for a
single reasonableness standard that includes the experiences of
mothers living within violent homes, we can continue to pres-
sure the law to account for the experiences of women in the le-
gal mainstream. This position avoids the argument that
battered women seek deferential consideration under the law.6
crimination injuriy Selection, 10 Wis. WoMEN's LJ. 403, 426 (1995). Expert testimony is
often needed to clarify and explain the psychological and societal aspects of a batter-
ing relationship because they are not within the understanding of the average juror.
See Lisa A. Linsky, Use of Domestic Violence Histoy Evidence in the CYiminal Prosecution: A
Common Sense Approach, 16 PACE L. REv. 73, 83 (1995).
Some scholars have proposed a "reasonable battered woman" standard, see Kit
Kinports, Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393, 450-54
(1988), as well as a "reasonable woman" standard as advocated by Phyllis L. Crocker,
The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HAIv.
WOMEN's LJ. 121, 152 (1985). Other feminist legal scholars have argued against the
adoption of a separate standard of reasonableness for women and critique the schol-
ars who propose them for suggesting new stereotypes of women while at the same
time narrowing the type of woman who might be able to take advantage of such a
standard. See, e.g., Maguigan, supra note 125, at 442-48 (stating there is no need for a
separate standard; all that is needed is for the trial judges to actually use the law that
applies).
' Kansas, Wisconsin and Missouri have constructed "reasonable battered woman"
or "reasonably prudent battered woman" standards.- See Maguigan, supra note 125, at
411 n.111. Pennsylvania is an example of a state that experimented with alternative
standards of reasonableness but ultimately rejected the idea that there was a need for
one. Id.
' Mosteller argues that the acceptance of BWS rests on shaky scientific ground.
Mosteller, supra note 317, at 487-90. He notes the imbalance that existed in the law
regarding the experiences of battered women and believes that political forces cre-
ated evidentiary rule changes which have restructured the law of self-defense. While
he believes the changes may be necessary because of our society's political denial of
violence against women, he states that the introduction of testimony regarding the
syndrome places the woman in a more favorable position. Id. But see Maguigan, supra
note 125, at 451-58 (stating that statistics indicate, in states where changes had been
made, the admission of BWS evidence did not guarantee acquittal, nor should it).
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V. A COHEsivE APPROACH TO CHANGE
[Y]ou don't have to be "soft on crime" or sympathetic... to find many questions about
the case troublingly [sic] unresolved. For example: Is first degree murder too excessive a
verdict for a woman who prosecutors never claimed struck her daughter at all.' 7
I hope this will help other mothers come forward if their children are being beaten or
punished to a bad extent.'6
A complex web of inadequately developed theoretical doc-
trine, judicial misinterpretation and a political process biased
against the assertion of women's legal rights impedes the ability
of battered mothers to defend themselves against murder
charges which are based on failure to protect statutes. The ap-
proach to eliminating those impediments must also be complex.
Problem solving must occur across all three areas-changes in
one area only will be futile.
A. RE-THINKING THE THEORETICAL DOCTRINE
As I have discussed, there are several areas of theoretical
criminal law doctrine that need to be re-examined with an eye
towards evaluating whether the underlying principles exclude
women's experiences from normative consideration. The rea-
sonable person standard is one such area where the scholarly
work is already in progress. The difficulty of coming to terms
with an appropriate standard of reasonableness has much to do
with our acceptance of vague notions of moral consensus. Eve-
ryone agrees that it guides the development of theoretical prin-
ciples, but no one has yet to offer a satisfactory explanation of
how the experiences of women, particularly those in violent
homes, are incorporated into the moral consensus. We need to
give more careful attention to whether society can or should
continue to treat violence in the home as behavior that is rare
and unusual. There is no easy answer apparent. Statistics tell us
that violence is present in a significant percentage of our fami-
lies. Yet, what moral and political repercussions do we as a soci-
ety experience when we accept violence as normative behavior?
M7 Editorial, Zile Deserves Tough Punishment, Yet Troubling Questions Linger, FLA. SUN-
SENINEL, June 9, 1995, at 20A (presenting a series of troubling questions about the
willingness to find Pauline Zile guilty of first degree murder).
'0 Folks, supra note 2, at 1B (conclusion of Pauline's list of regrets).
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We must continue to challenge the notion of moral consensus
to ensure that the diverse experiences of all women, not just
those women who fit the stereotype of the good
woman/mother, are included.39
In the area of omissions theory specifically, we need to re-
visit what we mean by "failure to protect." There needs to be
clarification as to whether the doctrine requires that the mother
engage in some conduct aimed at protecting the child or
whether we actually mean that the mother has a duty to save the
child. The two concepts are significantly different but are being
used interchangeably by courts and legislatures. The conflation
of the two terms puts the mother in a tenuous legal position and
permits the courts to look at the death of the child as conclusive
proof of the mother's failure to protect. In clarifying our un-
derstanding of omissions, we need to ask whether our explora-
tion of the mens rea element is complete. Would adding a third
inquiry which explored what effect the mother believed her ac-
tions would have be helpful to our understanding of whether
she actually responded to her duty to act? Finally, with regard
to omissions, legal theorists must engage in a more thorough
analysis of the definition of physical impossibility. We can use
the paradigm of the battered mother as a vehicle to explore
whether we can or should conceive physical impossibility as a
more flexible term rather the rigid one employed now. A more
flexible concept of physical impossibility can contribute to
opening the possibilities of defense for these mothers.
We need to continue to critique the limitations in the the-
ory of duress and coercion to determine whether the elements
of the defense, or our normative interpretations, result in a
gendered denial of availability of the defense, particularly for
women living in violent homes. Our understanding of the ef-
fects of violence and threats of violence upon the mental state
of a battered woman should be used to help evaluate whether a
battered mother's fear of injury to herself or fear of heightened
injury to her child can legitimately fit within the rubric of du-
ress. Further, an integrated approach to the discussion of rea-
3' Feminist theorists must be careful to learn from the discussion of which stan-
dards should be used to evaluate the behavior of battered women who kill their sig-
nificant others. A reasonableness standard that is narrowly revised to include only a
stereotypic view of good mothers, or an essentialized battered mother, is little im-
provement over the status quo.
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sonableness may help us to understand that a battered mother
has not intentionally or recklessly placed herself and her chil-
dren in a violent home where she would be subjected to duress.
B. JUDICIAL MISINTERPRETATION OF LAW
Judges need to be better educated on the connection be-
tween violence against the mother, violence against her child,
and her ability both to see opportunities to protect and to make
choices to protect. Judges must begin to differentiate among
the many types of battered mothers who appear before them.
To date, judicial recognition of the difference between a
mother who actually does nothing and a mother who is either
unaware of her child's danger or one engages in coping strate-
gies is sorely lacking. Judges must be sensitized to the fact that
cultural bias may compel them to view these different mothers
as one in the same.
We must continue to press judges to apply established rules
of evidence to battered mothers in a principled way. Rules gov-
erning the admissibility of expert testimony should be as appli-
cable to battered mothers as they are to battered women who
kill their spouses. Too few trial courts have recognized the dis-
parity created when a mother is denied the right to present ex-
pert testimony as to her mental state at the time her child is
killed. Similarly, evidentiary rules governing testimony of the
abuser's history of violence need to be applied uniformly, even
if that violence is directed only at the mother. Courts cannot
continue to refuse to recognize that a battered mother cannot
shrug off her own abuse simply because the batterer also abuses
her child. The evidence of the batterer's history of abuse is
relevant to her mental state at the time the child is killed.
C. POLITICAL ACTION: MONITORING THE DISCRETION EXERCISED
BY THE STATE IN CHARGING
In the 1970s, grass roots feminist groups stepped forward to
name the violence that women were experiencing, calling it
"date rape" and "woman battering." Their efforts profoundly
affected our thinking about criminal law principles and raised
society's awareness about violence against women. Unfortu-
nately, battered mothers do not engender sympathetic re-
sponses from the feminist community or from the public.
Nonetheless, political action is an appropriate tool to use to
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help secure these women's right to present a defense. At the
most basic level, the political process can be used to determine
the magnitude of the problem. We must find ways to make
these women visible within the criminal justice system. Their
present invisibility keeps us from tackling the difficult questions
concerning the morality of a battered mother's behavior.
We need to do better monitoring of state prosecutors to en-
courage them to exercise appropriate discretion in cases. At
present there is no body of case law where fathers or step-fathers
have been charged with failure to protect children actively
abused by mothers.371 Cases against fathers are few and far apart,
indicating that prosecutorial discretion is exercised more fre-
quently on behalf of fathers then it is on mothers.sn And where
children have been abused by mothers or step-mothers, no pub-
lic outcry for prosecution of fathers has occurred.s 3 As we be-
370 The Violence Against Women Act authorizes the federal government to conduct
studies to determine the prevalence of domestic violence in our country. See 42
U.S.C. § 13961. Through the VAWA, studies can be funded to evaluate the magni-
tude of the problem. As of the spring of 1996, the Battered Women's Clemency Proj-
ect in Florida identified 37 women whose first, second or third degree murder
charges involved a victim who was a child. Not all of these women are battered moth-
ers, but the Project hoped to investigate how many of them were battered. Unfortu-
nately, inadequate staffing due to lack of funds prevented the project from being
completed.
7' See supra note 68.
37 For example, no cases of first degree felony murder based on a failure to protect
theory have ever been filed in Florida against a father or boyfriend. Leet v. State, 595
So. 2d 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), is the only case located where a boyfriend was
charged and convicted. However, he was only charged with third degree felony mur-
der. The court remarked that the state, either accidentally or intentionally, had cho-
sen not to charge him with first degree murder as a principal. Id. at 961-62. Leet's
case is less compelling than those of battered mothers, since he had knowledge of
both the child's injuries and the mother's background of abuse. Nor was he sub-
jected to violence at the mother's hand.. Conversely, the lesbian lover of a mother
who actively killed her child was charged in Florida of first degree felony murder. See
Cardona v. State, 641 So. 2d 361, 362 (Fla. 1994) (lover pled to second degree felony
murder to avoid exposure to death penalty); see also State v. Rundle, 500 N.W.2d 916
(Wis. 1993) (where the state chose to prosecute father as an aider and abettor despite
the codification of the failure to protect legislation).
'7' In another case tried in the same county at the same time as Pauline Zile's trial,
the state charged Jessica Schwarz with the murder of her stepson. See supra notes 26-
32 and accompanying text. No charges were filed against the father. The apparent
inequity in the two cases prompted one reader to question whether a double standard
existed in the prosecution of the two cases. See Double Standard in Murder Charges?,
PALm B.AcH PosT, Apr. 22, 1995, at 19A. Also, compare the intensity of the outrage
against Susan Smith, supra note 14, with the reaction to a father in Florida who
drowned his two boys by driving them into the Everglades swamp. Death in the Ever-
glades, Mu HERALD, June 28, 1997, at 1A (after a dispute with his ex-girlfriend, a fa-
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come more aware of the real picture of violence within the
home, it is clear that women are more likely to be prosecuted
even where men are the ones actually harming the children.
They will be prosecuted when they are the active abusers and
they will be prosecuted as the "passive" abusers. Fathers, step-
fathers, boyfriends and other male intimates, on the other
hand, will be prosecuted only if they are caught actively abusing.
The failure of state prosecutors to exercise their discretion to
prosecute male intimates, few of whom are abused, demon-
strates that discretion is not being exercised on any principled
basis. If evenhanded prosecutions based on the duty of a parent
to a child were occurring, there would be a greater number of
cases of men being charged with failure to protect. The absence
of cases against fathers, step-fathers and boyfriends indicates
that prosecutors do not consider men to have the same legal ob-
ligation toward children that women have. "Mother only" fail-
ure to protect policies, regardless of whether they are official
policies or only socially driven policies, help substantiate argu-
ments that criminal law theories have a gender bias incorpo-
rated within the way the law is developed and applied.37 4
Feminist groups should organize around the issue of selective
prosecutions of battered mothers.75
ther drove car with his two sons into the lake and drowned them). The story made
first page news only in Miami. A Westlaw search produced less than twenty news arti-
cles on the event. Search of WESTLAW, NPPLUS and NPMJ databases (Sept. 1997).
'7' See Nancy S. Erickson & Nadine Taub, Sex Bias in the Teaching of Criminal Law, 42
RUTGERsL. REv. 309 (1990).
"' Although some jurisdictions have suggested that selective prosecution claims
based on gender are available and could be successfil, see, e.g., Futernick v. Sumpter
Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1057 (6th Cir. 1996), others have pointed out the difficulty
of such a claim. The prohibition against selective prosecution may be meaningless in
practice because courts require proof of discriminatory intent and effect, a burden
almost impossible to satisfy. See, e.g., Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federaliza-
tion of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643 (1997). This may be a frightening prospect
for lawyers, particularly when they have been assigned to represent an indigent
woman. A challenge of this nature would require research into local prosecutorial
practices which might be politically uncomfortable for the lawyer. The complexity of
such a challenge highlights the need for lawyers to fully familiarize themselves with
the multifaceted ways violence against mothers can influence and shape the mother's




I've tried and worked so hard for my life and my children and now it's ruined.76
We may never know if Pauline Zile was actually a battered
mother. There are hints that she fits within the category of
women and mothers who are trapped in violent households.
Unless she is granted a new trial we may never know the reality
of the world within the Zile intimate space. In this regard,
Pauline Zile shares the predicament faced by many women be-
fore battered women's syndrome was allowed to be presented in
their defense. Unlike them, however, Pauline enjoys no public
supporters, no group lobbying on behalf of her and other simi-
larly situated women, and no celebrities raising funds in her
name. Nor will we hear the expanded tale of her life in any
clemency proceeding. The legal future looks bleak for Pauline
Zile.
We do know, however, that violence within the home is no
longer a secret, and it hasn't been for some time. The plight of
women and children trapped in violent homes must not con-
tinue to be a low priority item for our society. If the law is truly
to offer protection to battered women and their children, it
must do so in a way that acknowledges the complexity of the
problem. The law cannot pretend to offer a battered woman its
shelter, only to put her in a house with no roof and no doors.
We cannot acknowledge the dangers to her and then refuse to
acknowledge that those very same dangers make it difficult for
her children to be safe within their own home. Given society's
perception of mothers, not fathers, as all-sacrificing beings, it is
difficult to reach the conclusion that there are some circum-
stances where the law should say it is justifiable or excusable
when the mother is unable to protect her child. Yet that is ex-
actly what should happen in the cases of some battered moth-
ers. No one, least of all the battered mothers, would want to say
that any child should die at the hands of an abuser within their
home. To the extent that the law can properly protect children,
it should. However, it does not follow that no mother should be
excused when her child dies as a result of violence within the
home. This is not to say that all women whose children have
been harmed or killed within the home should be excused for
376 Folks, supra note 2, at 1B (comments of Pauline Zile).
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the death of their children at the hands of others. The behavior
of mothers runs the full spectrum, from active abuser to actually
doing nothing because they may not care (this is true of fathers
and boyfriends as well, although the law still does not place pri-
ority on their protection of their children). That spectrum in-
cludes mothers who are battered and who may not be able to do
anything or who will never be able to do enough to save the
child. The law has always placed limits on parental duty. It is
time for courts and society as a whole to extend the full protec-
tion of the law to the battered mothers as well-even if that
means acknowledging that the mother can't always protect her
children and that she shouldn't always be required to die in
deference to her children.
